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RED FLAG

No. 21, 1 November 1981

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COMRADE DENG XIAOPING TALKS ON QUESTIONS OF CORRECTING PARTY WORK STYLE

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 2-8

[Text] 1. It Is Necessary To Completely and Accurately Master and Apply Mao Zedong Thought

The editorial of the "two newspapers and one magazine" of 7 February 1977, entitled "Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link" mentioned the erroneous guiding principle of the "two whatevers." On 10 April, Comrade Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter to the Central Committee in which he clearly pointed out, "We must forever apply accurate and complete Mao Zedong Thought to guide the whole party, the whole army and the people of the whole country, to triumphantly press forward the cause of the party and socialism and the cause of the international communist movement."

On 21 July 1977, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, addressing the 3d Plenary Session of the 10th CCP Central Committee, dwelt specifically on the question of applying accurate and complete Mao Zedong Thought to guide the party's cause. He said, "We must have a complete and accurate understanding of the system of Mao Zedong Thought, and we must be good at studying, mastering and applying the system of Mao Zedong Thought in order to guide all our work. Only thus can we avoid separating and distorting Mao Zedong Thought and damaging it." "We cannot understand Mao Zedong Thought just from individual sentences; we must gain a correct understanding from the entire system of Mao Zedong Thought. The 'gang of four,' especially the so-called theorist Zhang Chunqiao, distorted and tampered with Mao Zedong Thought. They quoted various fragments of Chairman Mao in order to deceive people and frighten them. We must truly appreciate Mao Zedong Thought. As far as problems in a field or an aspect are concerned, we must also accurately and completely understand Mao Zedong Thought." "Therefore I suggest that apart from doing a good job in compiling and publishing selected works of Mao Zedong, the comrades engaged in theoretical work should devote plenty of effort to expounding on the system of Mao Zedong Thought in every field. We must apply the system of Mao Zedong Thought to educate our party and guide us to forge ahead."

On 27 November 1978, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out when receiving some foreign friends: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the guiding ideology for our country to accomplish the four modernizations. He also said, in the course of accomplishing the four modernizations, we must be good at completely and accurately mastering and applying Mao Zedong Thought.

In his speech at the closing session of the central work conference on 13 December 1978, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, "The ideological system of Comrade Mao Zedong has nurtured our entire generation. It can be said that all the comrades present today were instructed by Mao Zedong Thought. It is not the slightest exaggeration to say that we would not have our Chinese Communist Party as it is today but for Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought will forever be the most precious spiritual treasure of the whole party, the whole army and the people of the whole country. We must completely and accurately understand and master the scientific system of Mao Zedong Thought, and also develop it in the new historical conditions. Of course, Comrade Mao Zedong was not without shortcomings and errors; it is not Marxist to demand that a revolutionary leader be without shortcomings or errors. We must lead and educate the whole body of party members, the whole body of PLA commanders and fighters and the people of all nationalities throughout the country to understand Comrade Mao Zedong's tremendous achievements in a scientific and historical way."

In his 30 March 1979 speech at the party's meeting to discuss ideological guidelines for theoretical work, Comrade Deng Xiaoping proposed that it is necessary to uphold the four basic principles. Speaking on the necessity of upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, he pointed out: "One of the key points of our struggle with Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' is that we opposed them in forging, tampering with and separating Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. By smashing the 'gang of four,' we have been able to restore afresh the scientific features of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and made it the guide for our actions. This is a great victory for the whole party and the people of the whole country. However there is a very small number of people who do not think in this way. They either openly oppose the basic principles of Marxism, or else support it in words but actually oppose Mao Zedong Thought, which is the product of integrating the universal truth of Marxism with the practice of the Chinese revolution. We must oppose all these erroneous trends of thought. Some comrades say, we only support 'correct Mao Zedong Thought,' and we do not support 'erroneous Mao Zedong Thought.' This is also an erroneous way of putting things. What we uphold and must regard as the guide for our action is the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, or the scientific system formed by these principles. As for individual theses, there are bound to be flaws, whether they come from Marx, Lenin or Mao Zedong. However such things do not come under the category of the scientific system formed by their basic principles." Comrade Deng Xiaoping also pointed out in this speech: "Scientific socialism forges ahead in the course of actual struggle, and so does Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. We obviously will not go back from scientific socialism to utopian socialism, nor will we allow Marxism to stay at the level of individual theses of several decades or a century ago. Therefore we repeatedly say, emancipating the mind means applying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to study the new situations and solve the new problems." "What is the greatest new situation and the biggest new problem for the whole party today? Obviously, it is to accomplish the four modernizations, or as I said above, to accomplish Chinese-style modernization. We have already spoken of studying in depth the new situations and new problems encountered in accomplishing the four modernizations in China, and have also given an answer of major guiding significance; this will be a major contribution of our ideological and theoretical workers to Marxism, and will mean truly holding aloft Mao Zedong Thought."

2. We Must Persistently Seek Truth From Facts

In his speech at the 3d Plenary Session of the 10th CCP Central Committee on 21 July 1977, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out when speaking on studying well Comrade Mao Zedong's theories on party building: "I hold that the mass line and seeking truth from facts are the two most fundamental things in the work style advocated by Chairman Mao. Of course the relationship between democracy and centralism and between freedom and discipline is very important. As far as the present situation in our party is concerned, I personally feel that the mass line and seeking truth from facts are particularly important."

Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his speech at the all-PLA political work conference on 2 June 1978: "We must never violate the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. There is no doubt at all about that. However we must integrate with reality, we must analyze and study the actual situation and solve the actual problems. To decide on guiding principles for work in accordance with the actual conditions is the most basic ideological and work method which all Communist Party members must remember at all times. Seeking truth from facts is the starting point and the fundamental point of Mao Zedong Thought. This is materialism. Otherwise, when we hold meetings, we could only utter empty talk and would be incapable of solving any problem." Comrade Deng Xiaoping also said, "The living soul of Marxism is to specifically analyze the specific situation. Unless Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is integrated with the actual situation, it has no vitality. The responsibility of our leading cadres is to integrate the instructions of the central authorities and the upper levels with the specific situation in our own units, and solve problems. They cannot act as 'message centers' and simply transmit the instructions in a mechanical way." He also said, "Please think about it, comrades. Are seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality in everything, and integrating theory with reality the fundamental viewpoint of Mao Zedong Thought or not? Is this fundamental viewpoint outdated, and can it be outdated? How can we call it Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought if we oppose seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality in everything, and integrating theory with reality in everything, and integrating theory with reality? Where would such actions lead us? Obviously, they could only lead us to idealism and metaphysics, to losses in work and defeat in revolution."

In his talks when inspecting Shenyang, Changchun and other places in September 1978, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: The basic point of Mao Zedong Thought is to integrate Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Chairman Mao's inscription for the Yanan party school consisted of four big characters, "seek truth from facts," and these four characters represent the basic point of Mao Zedong Thought. This is the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. Chairman Mao's greatness and his ability to lead the Chinese revolution to victory rest on this point. We have many conditions for accomplishing the four modernizations; these conditions did not exist during Chairman Mao's lifetime, but we have them now. There are many things we will be unable to undertake if we fail to consider problems in the light of present conditions and to summon up determination. As a result of several years of efforts, there are favorable international conditions for us to absorb advanced technology and capital from

abroad. We did not have this condition during Chairman Mao's lifetime. We could not summon up such resolution today if it is said that we should not do anything that Chairman Mao did not mention. We now have conditions that Chairman Mao never encountered, and we should grasp these conditions and make use of them to accomplish the goal of the four modernizations which Chairman Mao proposed and Premier Zhou proclaimed. This is called holding aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao. If we could only do things that Chairman Mao spoke of, what could we do now? Marxism itself must develop! Mao Zedong Thought must develop too! Otherwise it will become ossified!

Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his speech at the closing session of the central work conference on 13 December 1978: "If a party, a state or a nation proceeds from books in everything, its ideology will become ossified and superstition will run rampant. It will not therefore be able to advance, its life will come to an end, and the party and state will perish. Comrade Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed this point during the rectification movement. Only by emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality in everything and integrating theory with reality can our socialist modernization drive progress smoothly and can our party's Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought theory develop." He also said, "Seeking truth from facts is the foundation of the proletarian world outlook and the ideological foundation of Marxism. In the past we relied on seeking truth from facts in all the victories we won in the revolution, we must similarly rely on seeking truth from facts today in accomplishing the four modernizations."

In his 29 February 1980 speech at the 5th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, Comrade Deng Xiaoping dwelt specifically on problems of the party's ideological line. He said, "The third plenary session established, or, more accurately, reiterated the party's Marxist ideological line. Marx and Engels founded the dialectical and historical materialist ideological line, Chairman Mao summarized it in the Chinese language and wrote 'seek truth from facts,' four big characters, on the party school door. Seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality in everything, integrating theory with reality, taking practice as the sole criterion for testing truth--this is our ideological line."

Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a talk on 27 March 1981: "Comrade Chen Yun has said, when he returned to Yanan from Moscow, Chairman Mao said to him on three occasions that he should study philosophy, and laid particular stress on seeking truth from facts. Comrade Chen Yun felt that he benefited greatly from that. Now, certain people utter opinions most of which only look at the phenomena, because their theories are not rooted in practice. Only by laying down such a root can one truly correct errors, including 'leftist' and rightist errors. The Yanan rectification drive opposed subjectivism, sectarianism and stereotyped party writings; it solved the problems fundamentally, not superficially."

3. It Is Necessary To Revive and Carry Forward Our Party's Fine Traditions and Work Style

On 18 August 1977, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his "closing address at the 11th national congress of the CCP": "We must revive and carry forward the mass line, the fine tradition and style which Chairman Mao fostered in our party."

We must truly have faith in the masses and rely on them, listen to the voice of the people, have their well-being at heart and never for a moment divorce ourselves from them." "We must revive and carry forward the practice of seeking truth from facts, the fine tradition and style which Chairman Mao fostered in our party. The minimum requirement for a communist is to be an honest person, honest in word and honest in deed. Deed and word must correspond and theory and practice must be closely integrated. We must reject flashiness without substance and every sort of boasting. There must be less empty talk and more hard work. We must be steadfast and dedicated." "We must revive and carry forward the practice of criticism and self-criticism, the fine tradition and style which Chairman Mao fostered in our party. Within the party and within the ranks of the people, we should conscientiously apply the principle, 'say all you know and say it without reserve' and 'blame not the speaker but be warned by his words,' as well as the principle of unity-criticism-unity." "We must revive and carry forward the fine tradition and style of modesty and prudence, freedom from arrogance and impetuosity, and plain living and hard struggle, which Chairman Mao fostered in our party. We must wholeheartedly serve the Chinese people and the people of the world." "We must revive and carry forward the practice of democratic centralism, the fine tradition and style which Chairman Mao fostered in our party. We must strive for a political situation in the whole party, the whole army and the whole country, in which there is both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness."

On 30 March 1979, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out at the meeting to discuss the party's theoretical work: "In order to improve the general mood of society, it is necessary first of all to improve the party's work style. In particular, it is necessary to urge the party's leading comrades at all levels to set an example. The party is the model for the whole society, and the party's leading comrades at all levels are models for the whole party. If the party organization shelves the opinions and interests of the masses and remains indifferent, how can it expect the masses to have faith in and cherish its leadership. If the party's leading cadres do not set strict demands for themselves and do not observe party discipline and state law, if they violate the party's principles, practice factionalism, seek special privileges, secure advantages through pull or influence, indulge in extravagance and waste, feather their nests at public expense, do not share weal and woe with the masses, do not strive to be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, do not follow the decisions of the organization, do not accept supervision from the masses and even resort to retaliation against those who criticize them, how can we expect them to remold the general mood of society. At the present turning point in history, when problems pile up like mountains and a thousand things remain to be done, it is of decisive importance to strengthen party leadership and correctly orientate the party's work style. Comrade Mao Zedong said: 'As long as our party is completely honest and upright in work style, the people of the whole country will learn from us. As long as those people outside the party who have these unhealthy ways are good and honest, they will learn from us and rectify their mistakes. In this way, they will influence the whole nation.' Only by improving the party's work style can we change the prevalent social customs and uphold the four basic principles."

With reference to the question of upholding and improving party leadership in his 16 January 1980 report "On the Current Situation and Tasks," Comrade Deng

Xiaoping pointed out: "At present, the pressing issue before us is to restore the party's combat capabilities. The party should be a combat force, the vanguard of the proletariat. It should be a unified and well-disciplined contingent with a high sense of discipline. Only by restoring this state of affairs can the party have combat capabilities." "At present, some of our party members are not qualified. Some of the new party members who joined our ranks when the ultraleftist line held sway have never received any party education. They cannot set an example for the masses and are therefore not qualified. Some of our old party members have measured up to the requirements for a long time. However, they cannot set an example for the masses now and are therefore not so qualified. We advocate the party spirit and oppose factionalism. Some people desperately cling to their faction. There are many people whose factional spirit is higher than their party spirit, and among them are some of our old party members. How can these people qualify? Why was our party so powerful in the past? During the war years we used to say that if 30 percent of the soldiers of a company are party members, this company must be a good one with strong combat capabilities. Why? It is because party members are the first to charge forward and the last to retreat in fighting; because they are the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comfort in everyday life. In this way, they can set an example for the masses and become their core." "Some communists are different now. They have joined the party because they wanted to be the first to enjoy comforts and the last to bear hardships. In opposing privileges, we are actually opposing the seeking of personal privileges by some of our party members and party cadres. That is why we say that our efforts to revive and carry forward the party's fine traditions and work style involve a question of party members' qualifications. Whether or not they measure up to the qualifications and requirements is a question that is now put not only before the new party members but also before some old party members. Therefore, there does exist a question of rectification in our party."

In his speech at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee on 18 August 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, when speaking of the malpractices in the leadership system of the party and state, pointed out: "The chief malpractices are the phenomena of bureaucracy, overconcentration of power, patriarchal system, lifelong tenure of office for leading cadres, and special privileges of every description." He said, "Bureaucratic phenomena comprise a big problem that exists extensively in the political life of the party and state. Its chief manifestations and harmful effects are: standing high above the masses, abusing one's power, divorcing oneself from reality and the masses, being keen on keeping up appearances, indulging in idle talk, thinking in a rigid way, sticking to conventions, overstaffing organizations, having more hands than needed, being dilatory in doing things, not paying attention to efficiency, being irresponsible, not keeping one's promise, sending official documents everywhere, shifting responsibility onto one another, putting on sheer bureaucratic airs, giving people a lecture at the slightest provocation, retaliating, suppressing democracy, deceiving one's superiors and deluding one's subordinates, being imperious and despotic, resorting to bribery for the benefit of relatives or friends, perverting justice for a bribe, and so on. Either in our internal affairs or in our international contacts, this has developed to an intolerable extent." Comrade Deng Xiaoping also pointed out, "During the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' went in for special privileges, bringing about great calamities to the masses. At present, there are also a few cadres who do not

regard themselves as the servants but as the masters of the people. They go in for special privileges, bringing about the strong discontent of the masses and damaging the party's prestige. If these are not resolutely corrected, they will certainly corrupt our ranks of cadres."

In his speech at the central work conference on 25 December 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "To uphold the leadership of the party, it is imperative to improve the leadership and style of the party. At present, the party's work among the masses is slightly weaker than it was before the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' and the working method is crude in part. These have hindered the party's link with the masses. Only by strengthening vigorously the party's link with the masses and going deep into the masses to conduct ideological and political work will it be easy to overcome the many difficulties in the economic readjustment. The unhealthy tendency among the extremely small number of party members and cadres is very unfavorable to the restoration of the party's prestige among the masses. I agree with what Comrade Chen Yun has said that the question of the party's work style is one of life and death for a party in power. It is necessary to strictly carry out the 'guiding principles for inner-party political life,' and unswervingly rectify various unhealthy tendencies. It is especially necessary to resolutely oppose the erroneous attitude of feigning compliance and double-dealing toward the line, principles and policies of the CCP Central Committee."

In this speech, Comrade Deng Xiaoping proposed: "It is necessary to educate the comrades in the whole party in promoting the spirit of selflessness, subordinating oneself to the overall situation, carrying out arduous struggle and being honest in performing one's official duties, and to uphold communist ideas and morality. The socialist country that we are building should have not only a high degree of material civilization, but also a high degree of spiritual civilization. Spiritual civilization refers not only to education, science and culture (these are absolutely indispensable), but also communist ideas, ideals, faith, morality and discipline, revolutionary stand and principle, the comradely relationship between one person and another, and so on. These do not require very good material conditions or very high educational standards. Have we not joined the revolution up to now by relying on the scientific theory of Marxism and the revolutionary spirit stated above? From Yanan to new China, in addition to the correct political orientation, have we not relied on this valuable revolutionary spirit to attract the people of the whole country and the friendly personages abroad? Without this spiritual civilization, and without communist ideas and morality, how can we build socialism? The more the party and government carry out various economic reforms and an open foreign policy, the more the party members, especially the senior leading cadres of the party, should pay high attention to and earnestly practice communist ideas and morality. Otherwise, being disarmed spiritually, how can we educate the youths and lead the state and the people in building socialism. During the new democratic revolutionary period, we persisted in guiding the entire work with the communist ideological system and restraining the words and deeds of party members and advanced elements with communist morality. We advocated and commended wholehearted service to the people, 'the individual subordinating himself to the organization,' 'selflessness,' 'utter devotion to others without any thought of self,' and 'fearing neither hardship nor death.' Now that we have entered the socialist period, some people have gone so far as to

'repudiate' these solemn revolutionary slogans, and this preposterous 'repudiation' not only fails to meet effective resistance, but wins the sympathy and support of some people in our ranks. Can a party member who has party and revolutionary spirit tolerate the continued existence of this situation?"

Comrade Deng Xiaoping also said, "Comrade Mao Zedong said that a man should have a little spirit. In protracted revolutionary wars, under the guidance of correct political orientation, we proceeded from analyzing the practical situation and won great victories by carrying forward the revolutionary and death-defying spirit, the spirit of strictly observing discipline and of self-sacrifice, the spirit of selflessness and making things easy for others and taking the difficulties on oneself, the spirit of conquering all enemies and difficulties, and the spirit of upholding revolutionary optimism and surmounting every difficulty to win victory. To engage in socialist construction and achieve the four modernizations, it is likewise necessary to vigorously carry forward this spirit under the correct leadership of the CCP Central Committee. A party member who does not have this spirit cannot be regarded as a qualified one. Besides this, we should also spread this spirit among the entire people and youths by giving it great publicity and setting an example, so that it will become the main pillar of spiritual civilization of the PRC, cherished by all people in the world who demand revolution and progress and admired by many people in the world who lack spiritual ballast and suffer spiritual depression."

4. We Should Develop Criticism and Self-Criticism and Maintain Strict Discipline

On 2 June 1978, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his speech at the all-PLA political work conference, "One important point in rectifying and reorganizing the leading groups well is to rectify the work style. During the past years, Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' have seriously destroyed the army's work style, and their pernicious influence has taken deep root. In some units there are serious unhealthy trends and practices, and repeated orders cannot put an end to them. As a result, there is confusion between good and bad, the fragrant and the stinking and right and wrong. This state of affairs has roused the indignation of the masses, gravely impeded the mobilization of all positive factors and destroyed unity. We must criticize and put an end to these unhealthy trends and practices."

On 13 December 1978, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his speech at the closing session of the central work conference, "A country must have its laws and a party, its regulations and discipline. The constitution of a party comprises its most fundamental regulations and discipline. Without the regulations and discipline of the party, the laws of the state can hardly be effective. The tasks of the discipline inspection commissions and organizational departments at all levels are not only to handle cases, but also, and more important, to maintain the regulations and discipline of the party so as to earnestly effect a rectification of the party's work style. Anyone who violates the party's discipline should be punished accordingly so as to make a clear distinction between merits and demerits and between reward and punishment, thus fostering the healthy tendencies and dealing blows at the unhealthy tendencies."

On 16 January 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his report, "On the Current Situation and Tasks," "In order to uphold and improve the party's

leadership, we must intensify its discipline. During the 'Great Cultural Revolution' the party's discipline slackened and it has not yet been completely restored. This is an important reason why the party cannot play its proper role. Owing to the considerable laxity in discipline, many party members act as they please and regard the party's line, principles and policies and resolutions and the tasks the party assigns them as something they have the right to refuse to carry out or to carry out only partially. If a party allows its members to speak and act absolutely freely according to their individual will, naturally, it will be impossible for it to have a unified will or any combat effectiveness and it will also be impossible for it to successfully fulfill its tasks. Therefore, we should uphold and improve the party's leadership, strictly put the party's discipline into effect in order to greatly heighten our sense of discipline. An individual must obey the organization, the minority must obey the majority, the lower levels must obey the higher levels and the whole party must obey the Central Committee. We should strictly carry out the above principles. Otherwise, the party cannot form a combat collective and will be unqualified for the rank of pioneers." "The most important in the above principles is that the whole party must obey the Central Committee. The Central Committee has made mistakes, but these mistakes have long been corrected by the Central Committee itself. Nobody can be allowed to resist the leadership of the Central Committee on the pretext of its mistakes. Only if the whole party obeys the Central Committee strictly, can the party lead all its members and the people throughout the country to fight for the fulfillment of the great task of modernization. Should anyone seriously violate this rule, the party organizations and discipline inspection committees at all levels must strictly enforce disciplinary measures against them because the maximum interests of the party and the people of the whole country are at stake. We must resolutely carry forward and safeguard democracy in the party. Should a party member object to the party's decisions, he can state his views through the organization, or reserve his opinions, or even make suggestions to the Central Committee either through the organization or directly. From the Central Committee down, party organizations at all levels must seriously consider these opinions. However, everything that has been decided on by the Central Committee and by the party organizations must be obeyed until further changes are announced by the party. We must state our views in accordance with the party's decisions and must not willfully spread opinions that show distrust or dissatisfaction with and opposition to the line, principles and policies of the Central Committee. Party papers and journals must unconditionally publicize the party's position." "We must resolutely eliminate anarchist trends of thought which the 'gang of four' introduced into the party as well as all brands of bourgeois liberalism which have newly emerged within the party."

In his speech given at the 5th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee on 29 February 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, "Our party actually needs rectification at present. This matter was put forth 7 years ago and it has not yet been settled. Quite a number of the 38 million party members are not up to the mark. After this plenary session, it will be necessary to carry out education throughout the party linking it with the discussion on the draft of the revised party constitution and the implementation of the guiding principles for inner-party political life." "Those who are not up to the mark should carry out criticism and self-criticism. We should demand changes in them."

At his speech given at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee on 18 August 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, "In correcting the phenomenon of privileges, we have to solve both ideological problems and problems in systems. All citizens are equal before the law and all party members are equal before the party constitution and before the party's discipline. Each has equal rights and duties as stipulated by law and no one can gain extra advantages or violate the law. Anyone who breaks the law, no matter who he is, will be investigated by public security organs according to law, and judicial organs will handle his case according to law. No one is permitted to interfere and no one who breaks the law will remain at large. Any party member who violates the party constitution or the party's discipline, no matter who he is, will be punished. No one is permitted to interfere, and no party member who violates the party constitution or the party's discipline will remain at large. Only when these are resolutely enforced can we thoroughly solve the problem of privileges and the problem of discipline. We should establish a system for the masses and party members to supervise cadres, in particular, leading cadres. The people have the right to expose, accuse, impeach, replace and dismiss according to law any cadre who seeks privileges and who does not mend his ways after he is criticized and given education and to demand that he make economic restitution and be punished according to law and discipline. We should lay down rules and regulations for limits of cadres' functions and powers and for their remuneration both politically and in their livelihood. The most important thing is to have a special organization to carry out impartial and incorruptible supervision and checking."

In his speech on problems on the ideological front given on 17 July 1981, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, "The party has made outstanding achievements in its leadership over the ideological front and the literary and artistic front. This should be affirmed. There is also a certain tendency toward oversimplification and crudeness in our work. We should not deny or ignore this either. However, I think what needs more attention at present is the lax and weak situation. Erroneous trends cannot be criticized and criticism is regarded as using the big stick. At present, we find it difficult to carry out criticism and even more difficult to carry out self-criticism. One of the three essential work styles is self-criticism. This is something that marks the chief difference between our party and other political parties. However, quite a lot of people are still quite unable to carry out criticism and self-criticism." Comrade Deng Xiaoping also said, "At present, some people regard themselves as heroes. When they have not been criticized, their problem does not appear so serious, but once they are criticized, even more people become attached to them. This is a very abnormal phenomenon and we should strive to put an end to it. Of course, there are social and historical reasons for this phenomenon. It is mainly the sequel of the 10 years of disorder and is also the result of bourgeois erosion from abroad. We should make a concrete analysis of each individual case. But the main problem at present is not in the phenomenon itself but in how we look upon this phenomenon. In handling the problems at present, we should draw a lesson from the past and should not stage movements. We should appropriately handle the mistakes of each individual according to their nature, degree and his understanding of his mistakes. We should pay attention to the way of making criticism and should make appropriate criticism. We should not make joint attacks or stage movements. Nevertheless, it certainly will never do to abandon ideological work, criticism and self-criticism. We certainly should not abandon the weapon of criticism."

STRIVE TO ACHIEVE A FUNDAMENTAL TURN FOR THE BETTER IN PARTY WORK STYLE

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 9-12

[Article by our editorial department]

[Text] Our No 21 issue published an article entitled "Comrade Deng Xiaoping Talks on Questions of Correcting Party Work Style" which had been assembled from parts of speeches and reports given by Comrade Deng Xiaoping since 1977. These expositions of Comrade Deng Xiaoping set out earnestly, both concisely and comprehensively, and in a clear and vivid way the teachings of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought on party building. These expositions have already played a major guiding role in the political life of our party and state, and constitute the ideological weapon for building the party in the new historical period. Further studying and practicing these expositions of Comrade Deng Xiaoping will undoubtedly continue to play a major role in restoring and carrying forward the party's fine traditions and work style and enhancing the party's prestige and fighting strength.

Why did Comrade Deng Xiaoping repeatedly put forward, in such a way, the question of party work style to the whole party? And why did the central leading comrades repeatedly stress "the question of work style of the ruling party is related to the question of life-and-death of the party"? This is a matter which gives us much food for thought. We can now clearly see that the question of work style is put forward as a fundamental question in the experience of the party's building over the past decades. Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and amid long-term revolutionary struggles, our party has gradually cultivated and toughened a complete set of fine traditions and work style. The main points are: the work style of seeking truth from facts and integrating theory with practices; the work style of working in close connection with the masses; the work style of launching criticism and self-criticism; the work style of wholeheartedly serving the masses; the work style of being humble and meticulous and launching arduous struggles; and so forth. This completely integrated fine work style is closely integrated with our party's line. It has emerged from the party's political, ideological and organizational lines and is, simultaneously, a guarantee for smoothly implementing the party's line, principles and policies. The masses are accustomed to judging our party by the work style of the party members and the party cadres. So long as our party members and party cadres, in particular, leading party comrades at all levels, truly uphold and carry forward the party's traditions and work style, and exemplarily implement the party's line, principles and

policies with the spirit of working and struggling selflessly for the public interests, the broad masses will be united around our party and will sincerely follow the party. Thus, our party will overcome all difficulties and the revolutionary and construction causes will flourish. Our party is presently the ruling party and it shoulders the great historical mission of leading the people of all nationalities throughout the country, at the present stage, to construct a strong and modern socialist country and of struggling to achieve communism in the future. The historical mission demands that our party keep alive the youthful fervor for struggle of the proletariat. "Strengthening party leadership and correcting party work style is of critical significance at the current historical turning point where a heap of problems are awaiting solution and numerous tasks remain to be undertaken." ("Speech delivered by Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the meeting to discuss the ideological guidelines for the party's theoretical work") At present, the leadership of the Central Committee is strong, the party's line, principles and policies are correct, and the leading comrades of the Central Committee are laboring day and night for the party's cause. However, speaking of the party as a whole, severe unsavory trends still exist in our ideology and work style and have become an obstacle on the path of constructing socialist modernization. If we pay no attention to fundamentally correcting the party work style, how can we uphold the four basic principles or guarantee the implementation of the party's line, principles and policies? Hence, how can we unite the broad masses to do a good job of actual work on various fronts and efficiently carry out the building of socialist material and spiritual civilization? All party comrades are acutely confronted with the question of party work style.

What is, in fact, the situation of our party work style? Comrade Hu Yaobang recently pointed out that there has not been a fundamental turn for the better in the party's work style. This was to point out primarily that our party work style has been turning for the better, not for the worse. Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the Central Committee has put correcting the party's work style on its daily agenda and adopted a series of measures including the formulation and institution of the "guiding principles for inner-party political life." Major progress has been made. We can see that there has been a notable turn for the better in party work style among a large number of party members and party cadres, and in particular, the leading cadres. This is a fact that we cannot deny. However, generally speaking, there has not yet been a fundamental turn for the better in the party's work style, and revising and carrying forward the party's fine traditions and work style remains an urgent and important combat task. For instance, there is the bourgeois liberalization trend of departing from the socialist track and party leadership; there are phenomena of bureaucratism in adopting an irresponsible attitude toward the tasks assigned by the party and people; there is departmentalist behavior in caring only for partial interests and harming the interests of the whole; there is erroneous behavior in waving the signboard of "representing the masses' interests" and taking advantage of the state the moment the chance arises, thus damaging the state's interests; there is pursuit of private interests, and all kinds of behavior that violates law and discipline; and there is anarchism and extreme individualism, and so on and so forth. These things still exist to a serious extent among some of our party members and cadres. This is a fact that must be acknowledged. This is because, due to the all-round internal conflict of the "Great Cultural Revolution" and especially to the sabotage carried out by

the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques, our party's work style was completely ruined and the party's organism and image suffered tremendous damage. At the same time, the remnants of feudal thought which have come down from the old society and the influence of bourgeois thought still burden our society, while erosion caused by bourgeois thought from external sources is now becoming a pressure on our society. These things are reflected in various forms in our party. Therefore the whole party must continue to make efforts, grasp the correction of party work style as a priority affair in party building, and strive for a fundamental turn for the better either next year or soon after that.

As far as the question of correcting party work style is concerned, the majority of our party cadres hold a unanimous view. However, we can also see that some comrades argue over whether opposing rightism or leftism is of primary significance. Such a contention is of no significance today since the party has already fundamentally accomplished the task of turning chaos into order in its guiding ideology. For many years in the past, one of our party's principles has been to launch two-line struggles, carry out specific analyses of specific situations and oppose whatever is wrong. As far as actual practice is concerned, we still shoulder the task of correcting leftist mistakes. When the CCP Central Committee puts forward now the demand for opposing bourgeois liberalization, it does not imply that there is no need for further criticizing and correcting the leftist mistakes in our actual practice. Both leftism and rightism are defined on the basis of our party's guiding ideology, and we cannot use leftism or rightism to judge and generalize the nature of all passive phenomena. Some comrades even adopt a doubtful and resentful attitude toward the CCP Central Committee's proposal to oppose bourgeois liberalization and hold that correcting party work style is more important than opposing bourgeois liberalization. In the light of such a view, it seems that bourgeois liberalization is not an unsavory trend, that this erroneous tendency of advocating "absolute freedom" does not give rise to anarchism, extreme individualism or other bourgeois ideology, and that such an erroneous tendency does not constitute a question of party work style even if it has been seriously reflected within the party. It is obvious that this view is groundless. There exists a small number of people, including some party members and party cadres, who see our party as a dark picture and thus place themselves in a position that is antagonistic to the party. This is, in fact, a very serious mistake and is more than just a question of the party work style if the people involved are party members.

Some comrades lack sufficient confidence in correcting party work style and display a pessimistic and passive attitude toward it. It must be pointed out that there are no grounds for this pessimism, while a passive attitude is even more wrong. Why is this? First, many of our party members and cadres have consistently maintained the party's fine traditions and work style, and uprightness is the main current in the party, while unhealthy trends and bad practices are side issues; the masses and party members are extremely unhappy about unhealthy trends and are right now stepping up the struggle against them. Second, the Central Committee and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission are resolved to improve the party's work style and are currently making serious efforts to solve one by one the existing problems in party work style. In addition, the leading comrades of the Central Committee have already set examples and demanded

that "the central organs set an example for the whole country." Third, party organizations in many places and departments have taken action to improve party work style and are currently taking a series of relatively effective measures to that end. Fourth, and most fundamental, our party, as a great Marxist party that has undergone long testing in struggle, has always regarded unhealthy trends and practices as illegal and impermissible under the party's rules and regulations, and has consistently opposed them. This is because these things are diametrically opposite to the party's nature of a proletarian vanguard force. "We possess the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of unsavory practices and maintain fine work style." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Vol 4, p 1377) Historical experience shows that, under correct leadership and guidance of the correct line, the party's work style will definitely be improved. Our party work style was very good and won the masses' general approval during the Yanan period, liberation war period and in the 1950's since the founding of the state. We have ample reason for believing that, under the leadership of the Central Committee, we will certainly be able to bring about a fundamental turn for the better in party work style and to do still better in building our party.

Of course, we must also fully realize that we are bound to encounter difficulties in correcting and changing the party's work style. Most of the difficulties are not trivial ones and we must not lower our guard. The reason for this is that certain unsavory trends are of long standing and are deep-rooted, and obstacles from various aspects are bound to crop up in the course of making corrections. Some people promote unsavory trends taking advantage of the flaws of our party's leadership system and the weak links in the work of all sectors and trades. Thus, correcting unsavory trends demands that we improve and perfect the party's leadership system and the work system of all departments and units. The development of certain unsavory trends is also a reflection of class struggle in a certain realm. Can it be termed unsavory for those new exploiting elements who steal, engage in speculation, smuggling and tax evasion, and practice corruption to rope in and corrupt our party members and party cadres? We are struggling against unsavory trends in close connection with struggling against these new exploiting elements. In addition, corrupt organization and corrupt work style are crisscrossed in some districts and some departments, and corrupt organization always shields corrupt work style. The existence of the remnants of feudal ideology and the invasion of bourgeois individualism and bourgeois liberalization are the principal ideological root of the unsavory party work style. These corrupt thoughts always and for a long period of time affect our party's forces. Therefore, we must fight long-term tenacious battles in order to struggle against various unsavory trends inside the party. We communists have always been dauntless before difficulties. Will we shrink back at the sight of the difficulty in correcting party work style and attempt nothing and accomplish nothing? Our party's combat style is to press forward in the face of difficulties, dare to do anything, and be bold and good at solving all problems that we are confronted with.

It is necessary for all party comrades to make concerted efforts in order to rapidly achieve a fundamental turn for the better in party work style. It is necessary, first of all, for all party comrades to sincerely support the line, principles and policies formulated since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP

Central Committee and maintain political unanimity with the party Central Committee. Each and every one of our party members and party cadres, in particular the leading cadres, must spontaneously and conscientiously abide by the "guiding principles for inner-party political life," carry forward the party's fine traditions and work style and strive to become qualified Communist Party members. As far as the question of party work style is concerned, leading comrades at all levels should have a clear-cut and firm stand, play exemplary roles and set good examples. Party organizations at all levels must be bold in upholding principles and must also vigorously support and commend those people who are bold in struggling against unsavory trends. We must promptly change the situation, if some good comrades are found isolated in certain places. As regards those comrades who have been engaging in promoting unsavory trends, we welcome their conscientious corrections. And regarding those party members who recklessly corrupt party work style and refuse to repent despite repeated lessons, we must carry out severe criticism and necessary struggles against them; and serious cases of a malicious nature are subject to party disciplinary action or legal sanction.

The party's loud appeal to the public to correct party work style makes some people worry whether it means promoting leftism again. In order to struggle against the unsavory trends, we must adopt appropriate principles and means and work in a resolute and scheduled way. Simultaneously, we must prevent simplification and reckless deeds and still must not promote "cruel struggles or merciless blows." However, the main problem existing currently in many districts and units is that the authorities concerned pay no attention to supporting or commending good people and good deeds and dare not criticize, expose or deal with those people who are engaged in promoting the unsavory trends and their erroneous deeds. They only skirt round difficulties, manifesting weak and lax leadership. This is one of the important factors accounting for why there has not yet been a turn for the better in party work style. The party Central Committee has already pointed out: party organizations in which such a phenomenon is found must rapidly change their state of weakness and laxity and must be truly strengthened. Leadership groups should make certain appropriate readjustments if some comrades fail to meet the job requirements. However, what should we do in the case of inefficient leading cadres? Thus, it demands that they be determined, and act on their own initiative to conscientiously carry out self-criticism. At present, whether we can uphold the party's fine work style, struggle against the unsavory trends or resolutely correct unsavory practices is a test confronting party members.

In the course of struggling against the unsavory trends, some comrades are afraid of hurting the feelings of the old and senior colleagues, old fellow colleagues, old folks and old subordinates. "All those without feelings may not be true heroes" (from a poem by Lu Xun); we communists also care about feelings. Lenin said: "There has never been, nor can there be, any human search for truth without 'human emotions.'" ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol. 20, p. 255) We always treat our fervent love toward the party, the motherland and the people and our hatred toward our enemy, bad people and bad deeds as the motive force to push forward our causes. We absolutely cannot allow our personal feelings to go beyond or take the place of our feelings toward the causes of our party and the people. It is because we fervently love the party and the people that we cannot withstand the unsavory trends which jeopardize the party and the people. Emotions, and in

particular personal emotions, always hoodwink reason. People will be easily led astray if we only stress personal feelings in disregard of party principles. As a matter of fact, launching education by criticism of those comrades who have engaged in promoting unsavory trends and helping them correct their mistakes is a lofty and valuable proletarian sentiment. There is no comparison between such unselfish sentiments and those kinds of vulgar feelings such as practicing favoritism and sheltering others' mistakes.

In dealing with those comrades who are engaged in practicing unsavory trends, it can be said that our party has already shown utmost endurance and has urged time and again with good intentions. Nevertheless, some people simply do not take heed of them and persist in their old ways, pushing party regulations and laws to the back of their minds. All party members are equal before the party constitution and party discipline. "Nobody can act in violation of the party constitution and party discipline. Anyone who does so will be subject to disciplinary punishment. No one is allowed to interfere or remain at large." (Deng Xiaoping: "Speech Delivered at an Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo") We must adopt educational, administrative, economic, party disciplinary and legal means to check those who try every possible means to promote unsavory trends and violate law and discipline from taking advantage in all aspects and absolutely forbid them from remaining at large. We must make extra efforts to grasp and carry out investigation into cases which are greatly harmful, exert malicious influence and have hard roots. It is necessary to deal with them openly in order to strike blows at the sinister mood, promote healthy tendencies and educate the party members and the masses. The resolution adopted at the sixth plenary session pointed out: "It is necessary to rectify the party organizations, purify the party's forces and eradicate those corrupt elements who always suppress the masses." This is an important decision which represents the whole party's will and we must resolutely implement it.

We now shoulder a heavy burden and the masses have set very high demands on us. At his speech delivered at the sixth plenary session, Comrade Chen Yun said: "The Central Committee and the whole party must work cautiously and conscientiously." In order to rapidly bring about a fundamental turn for the better in party work style so as to subsequently bring about an improvement in the social mood and social order, all of our party members should enhance our revolutionary vigor, give play to our pioneer roles and try our best to accomplish our tasks.

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THE SPLENDOR OF THE ZUNYI MEETING SHOULD NOT BE BLURRED—REFUTING LI DE'S SLANDER OF THE ZUNYI MEETING

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 13-19

[Article by Wu Xiuquan [0124 0208 2938]]

[Text] The achievements and significance of the Zunyi meeting is highly appraised in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" that was unanimously approved at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee. It says, "In January 1935, the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee convened a meeting in Zunyi during the Long March, which established the leading position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Red Army and the party Central Committee. This saved the Red Army and the party Central Committee, which were then in critical danger, and subsequently made it possible to defeat Zhang Guotao's splittism, bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion and open up new vistas for the Chinese revolution. It was a vital turning point in the history of the party." What should be pointed out is that this has been our party's consistent view of the Zunyi meeting and is an historic conclusion. This conclusion has not only passed the test of history but will shine brightly forever. Every true Chinese communist and revolutionary will continuously draw wisdom and strength from this conclusion. Is there, however, any one who opposes this historic conclusion? Yes, there is. Besides Wang Ming, the most conspicuous opponent was Li De. Li De is a German (original name Otto Braun) sent by the Comintern in 1933 to the central revolutionary base area as a military adviser. He was mainly responsible for the failure of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression." Hence, he was severely criticized and deprived of his power of military command at the Zunyi meeting. This was natural, but it has always remained bitter in his memory. Since the 1960's--since the Soviet leading clique started its wanton campaign against China--Li De has taken an active part in anti-Chinese activities and has written articles and books one after another to frenziedly attack the Zunyi meeting. As his interpreter at that time and as one who attended the Zunyi meeting without the right to vote, I have the duty and responsibility to publicize the irrefutable facts and refute Li De's slanders so that people may have a correct view of the meeting.

I

Li De's attack on the Zunyi meeting began with his distortion by every means of the situation immediately before the meeting. He alleged that the situation at

that time "was by no means in a crisis as was described in Chinese official historical records" but was unusually good. He said, "In the year from October 1933 to October 1934, the outnumbered and poorly equipped central Red Army steadfastly stood its ground despite the attack of half a million Kuomintang troops armed with modern equipment. Moreover, it inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Later, the Red Army reorganized in an orderly way, broke through four encirclement lines without a hitch and preserved its effective strength." He also said, "The central Red Army had never been able to be so free in its maneuvers, and it was entirely possible for it to act on its own initiative." According to this description, the Red Army, instead of losing, won its fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," and at the beginning of the Long March, the Red Army broke through the four encirclement lines of the enemy easily and "without a hitch." In short, before the Zunyi meeting the Red Army was not "on the verge of perishing" but was "able to be free in its maneuvers." Was this true? No, it was not. It was a pure distortion and lie.

Let us first look at the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression." Ever since the birth of the Red Army, its destiny was connected with campaigns against "encirclement and suppression." The history of the 10 years of war of the Red Army was a history of carrying out these campaigns. The victory of a campaign against "encirclement and suppression" means the smashing of the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." Defeat in a campaign against "encirclement and suppression" means failure to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." By this criterion, we see that the first, second, third and fourth enemy campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" were indeed smashed by us. Therefore, we were said to have won victories in them. As a practical manifestation, our Red Army expanded and grew stronger instead of becoming weaker, and our base areas were preserved, restored or even expanded instead of being reduced or lost. What was the fact in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression"? The 1 year of bitter fighting of the Red Army only resulted in the "daily reduction of its numbers and land." Finally, it had to give up its base area.

The fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" ended in total failure. This was a fact that no one can deny. Why did it end in failure? This was the evil result of Wang Ming's leftist adventurism and was also the result of Li De's arbitrary and impracticable military command. At that time Comrade Bo Gu was the party general secretary. But he knew nothing of military affairs and relied for everything military on Li De. Thus he submissively surrendered all the power of military command to this foreigner. Banking on his position as a representative sent by the Comintern and exploiting the Chinese comrades' respect for the Comintern, Li De abolished the collective leadership of the army in order to set up his personal autocracy and acted arrogantly, doing all the decisionmaking himself. Nominally, he was only a military adviser, but in reality he was the commander-in-chief and the "overlord." Li De and those like him knew nothing of and did not try to understand China's national conditions and the particularity of the Chinese revolutionary war. They completely rejected the Red Army's experience gained in bloody fighting. They not only deprived Comrade Mao Zedong of his leadership over the Red Army, but also did their utmost to oppose and attack his correct military line and called it "guerrillaism" and "flightism." During the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," Li De and those like him carried out adventurism in attacking the enemy and upheld the practice

of "engaging the enemy outside the gate" at the beginning. Then they carried out conservatism in defense and upheld the practice of "dividing the forces to guard various places," delivering "short swift thrusts" and fighting a war of attrition. In the end, they had to retreat from the central revolutionary base and practice "flightism" in its true sense. During this period, proceeding from his great sense of revolutionary responsibility, Comrade Mao Zedong, though "deprived of all his posts," still "tried to give his advice." He time and again made correct suggestions for smashing the enemy's fifth campaign of "encirclement and suppression," but all of them were rejected by Li De and others. These were the principal military mistakes during the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," and they were the major causes for its defeat. Comrade Bo Gu was of the same opinion when he came to understand the situation. In his speech at the "seventh CCP national congress," he said, "Concerning the military line, the division of forces to guard various positions, the practice of delivering 'short swift thrusts' and of fighting a war of attrition constituted the major causes for the defeat in the fifth campaign against 'encirclement and suppression.'" Li De's desperate denial of the failure of this campaign was aimed at covering up his share of responsibility for the defeat.

Next, let us look at the breakthrough of the four encirclement lines. According to Li De, "the four encirclement lines were broken through without a hitch." But the facts are by no means so simple. At the beginning of the Long March, Li De was reduced from adventurism in attacking to flightism in retreat. As for the major issue of strategic transference, they failed to effect either a profound ideological mobilization among the cadres and the broad masses or the necessary preparations for shifting from positional warfare to mobile warfare and from relying on the base areas to leaving them and for fighting along a long march. Instead they transferred the troops in haste. During the transfer, they passively avoided fighting and fixed their minds on flight and were at a complete loss when anything happened. As a result, during the 1 and 1/2 months from the time they set out from the base areas in the middle of October 1934 to their forced crossing of the Xiang River at the end of November, the Red Army paid the great price of losing more than half of its commanders and fighters, whose number declined sharply from more than 80,000 at the beginning to 30,000, though it successfully broke through the four encirclement lines of the enemy by bloody fighting. This is how the true historical facts stand.

Another point I should make was that, having suffered such heavy losses, Li De clung to the original plan of meeting with the second and sixth Red Army groups in spite of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had transferred over 100,000 troops to western Hunan to intercept the Red Army. If the Red Army had acted according to this plan, it would have had to fight a final battle against a superior enemy force which was 5 or 6 times greater in number. It might have been totally wiped out. At this critical moment, Comrade Mao Zedong persistently proposed that the original plan be abandoned and that the army move into Guizhou, where the enemy forces were weaker. His opinion was accepted by most of the leading comrades, and he thus saved the Red Army. This was the actual beginning of Comrade Mao Zedong's correct military leadership.

II

At the Zunyi meeting efforts were concentrated on solving the military and organizational problems that were of decisive significance at that time. The leading groups of both the party and the army were reorganized: Comrade Bo Gu was dismissed from the post of general secretary and Li De was deprived of his power of military command. Comrade Zhang Wentian was elected the general secretary and Comrade Mao Zedong was elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and a member of the Secretariat. Soon afterward, a military command group was set up, with Comrade Mao Zedong as its head and Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang as its members. This three-man command group became the highest military command and was in charge of directing the actions of the whole army. The whole party had confidence in Comrade Mao Zedong and entrusted to him the grand power of military command that was of decisive significance and was vital to the existence of our party and army at that time. Thus Comrade Mao Zedong's leading position in the Red Army and the CCP Central Committee was established. This was the greatest achievement of the Zunyi meeting, and was a tremendous turning point of the greatest historical significance. This achievement and turning point aroused Li De's inveterate hatred. He used the most vicious language to wantonly spread calumnies and slanders. He said that as far back as during the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," Mao Zedong, Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) and Wang Jiaxiang had formed a sectarian political leading group--the "three-man central group"--"aimed at capturing the leadership of the party and the army" and "had been carrying out a secret struggle." When the Red Army arrived in Zunyi, Mao Zedong "forced" the Central Committee to hold an enlarged meeting of its Political Bureau. At the meeting, "what concerned Mao was carrying out a sectarian struggle without principle instead of solving the vital problems of principle," and so on. Why was the Zunyi meeting held? Was the Zunyi meeting held to "solve vital problems of principle" or to "carry out sectarian struggle without principles"? These are major problems that we should clarify.

The allegation that Mao Zedong "forced" the Zunyi meeting to be held is purely a lie and no facts can be found to support it. As we all know, the meeting was held simply because of "the trend of the times and the desire of the people." As was said before, Wang Ming's leftist adventurism inflicted serious losses on our party and caused grave setbacks to the revolution and serious defeats to the Red Army. All this evoked doubt and resentment throughout the party and among the broad masses of commanders and fighters. During the passive, purely defensive fighting in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and along the arduous course of the initial segment of the Long March, everybody was harboring these doubts: Why did Wang Ming always lose battles despite his pledge of "100 percent" correctness? Why did the first, second and third campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" led by Comrade Mao Zedong win victories, though at that time the number of Red Army troops was only 30,000 to 40,000? Why did the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," with a greater number of Red Army troops and more consolidated base areas, fail under the command of Li De, the military adviser from the Comintern, while the fourth campaign under the command of Zhou Enlai in accordance with Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics win victory? The lessons drawn from setbacks and defeats made people wiser. More and more people, including many of those who had supported the

leftist mistakes, began to see the truth. They became aware that Wang Ming's "100 percent" correctness was only a lie and Li De's military theory and command was wrong. Only Comrade Mao Zedong's ideas and command guaranteed that the Red Army would win every battle. Every commander and fighter began to entertain the common hope for Comrade Mao Zedong's return to the post of leading the revolution and commanding the battles. This was the real historical background of and the profound mass basis for the Zunyi meeting. A vivid illustration of this point was Comrade Peng Dehuai's firm boycott of and opposition to Li De's military mistakes. At that time Peng was the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Group. During the Guangchang Battle in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," Li De and others went to the Third Army Group to personally supervise the fighting. They forced the army to fight a positional war and made it fight the enemy in a war of attrition. As a result, the army suffered heavy losses. Afterward, Comrade Peng Dehuai sharply criticized them despite their power and arrogance. I personally saw and heard Comrade Peng Dehuai angrily say to Li De, pointing at Li's nose with his finger, "You acted like a squanderer selling his father's land and never feeling sorry about it!" These were weighty words. They praised Comrade Mao Zedong's correct line and bitterly attacked Li De's erroneous command. Once the Long March began, Li De and others carried out flightism and issued a compulsory order for the major forces to move like "a family carrying its belongings through corridors." This resulted in our army's being passive when attacked and suffering heavy losses because of its slow movement owing to the heavy baggage it carried. Comrade Peng Dehuai resented this strategy and tactics and said angrily, "Marching as if carrying a bier on the back--what a way to fight a war! As if the revolution was child's play--how foolish!"

The holding of the Zunyi meeting was inevitable. Moreover, the meeting shouldered the historic task of solving "vital issues of principle"--solving the issues concerning the life and death of the Red Army. It is precisely because of these achievements and significance that the Zunyi meeting has become famous in history and will be remembered forever. Li De, however, described the meeting as one to "carry out sectarian struggle without principle." This is a malicious attack and abject slander.

Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist-Leninist, and in inner-party struggle he was a paragon not only of adherence to principle but also of observance of organizational discipline. The dogmatic faction headed by Wang Ming vigorously carried out the erroneous policy of "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" inside the party. They resorted to every possible means, including sticking on labels, wielding big sticks, and carrying out dismissal and punishment, in order to attack Comrade Mao Zedong. Comrade Mao Zedong never yielded but persisted in fighting them. But in fighting them he always took into account the whole situation and was exacting in matters of strategy. Recently I heard an old comrade say that after the Zunyi meeting he asked Comrade Mao Zedong why he did not come out to oppose Wang Ming's line and raise the banner against Wang Ming earlier, since Mao had opposed and saw the mistakes of Wang Ming's line long ago. There was no need to let Wang Ming rule the party for as long as 4 years. Comrade Mao Zedong said that he had to wait for the right time. At that time we were in a war situation and we had to have a unified and united party to rally against the enemy and the Kuomintang's five campaigns of "encirclement and

suppression." The Kuomintang wanted to completely wipe us out. How could we counter the Kuomintang's five campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" if we did not have a unified party? Would it not have made it easier for the enemy to wipe us out if Mao Zedong had raised a banner to oppose Wang Ming's line, split the party from within and launched a war within the party. What this old comrade said was true. It showed Comrade Mao Zedong's correct attitude toward inner-party struggle.

It is true that, in the course of fighting Wang Ming's adventurism, Comrade Mao Zedong associated with Comrade Zhang Wentian and Comrade Wang Jiaxiang, but the relationship was entirely based on Marxist-Leninist principles and was the relationship between comrades and comrades-in-arms. Li De's obstinate allegation that they formed a "faction" was a pure frame-up. Everybody knows that, at first, Comrades Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang supported Wang Ming's leftist mistakes. Later, however, in the face of both the positive and the negative results of the test of practice, they gradually saw their mistakes and the bitter lessons of the repeated failures in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression." The fact that they were forced to make a Long March made them understand Wang Ming's leftist mistakes and the correctness of Comrade Mao Zedong's ideas. Therefore, they resolutely renounced Wang Ming's leftist mistakes and firmly came over to the side of Comrade Mao Zedong's correct line. This was an honest and magnificent act of correcting mistakes and submitting to truth.

Comrades Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian played an important role at the Zunyi meeting. They criticized the leftist military mistakes of Li De and others in both their speeches and reports at the Zunyi meeting. Zhang was, moreover, entrusted to draft the resolution of the meeting. It was not by accident that they did these things. Take Wang for example. He was one of the comrades who saw the military mistakes of Li De and others early. It was he who first proposed holding the Zunyi meeting. In the course of the Long March, Comrade Mao Zedong was carried on a stretcher because of illness and so was Wang because of a serious wound. According to his reminiscence, "On the way, Chairman Mao talked with me about some problems concerning the state and the party. He instructed me in the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution so as to make me discuss with him the idea of holding the Zunyi meeting. His words intensified my determination to support him." Wang's proposal to hold the Zunyi meeting met with the support of Comrades Zhang Wentian and Nie Rongzhen as well as Comrade Mao Zedong. At the meeting, Wang was the first person who gave a speech, and he firmly supported in his speech Comrade Mao Zedong's serious and just criticism of the military mistakes of Li De and others. Take Comrade Zhang Wentian for another example. Not long after the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" began, at an interval during a meeting of the Military Commission, he said to me, "Do we have prospects for victory when we fight in this way?" This showed that at that time he had already entertained some doubts about Li De's military line. These doubts gradually grew and resulted in his making a proposal "not to fight the enemy in a desperate manner" at a discussion meeting after the Guangchang Battle and his quarrel with Comrade Bo Gu over it. Li De showed great "concern" about this. He told Bo Gu to pass the word to Comrade Zhang Wentian that "affairs here must depend on comrades from Moscow." This meant that the comrades from Moscow such as Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian should not quarrel among themselves. Comrade Zhang

Wentian simply paid no attention to this "advice" of Li De's and stuck to his views without fearing rejection or attack. Therefore, there was a profound ideological basis for Comrades Wang Jiaxiang's and Zhang Wentian's firm support for and close cooperation with Comrade Mao Zedong at the Zunyi meeting.

In evaluating the achievements and significance of the Zunyi meeting, we should not fail to mention Comrade Zhou Enlai. During the meeting, he firmly stood on the side of Comrade Mao Zedong. This was an important factor for the success of the meeting. Li De tried to spread confusion about this fact. On the one hand, he could not but admit that "obviously" Zhou Enlai "had already made a clear distinction between Bo Gu and me, and himself" and "publicly gone over to Mao Zedong." On the other hand, he tried his utmost to create the false impression that at the Zunyi meeting Comrade Zhou Enlai seemed wavering and uncertain. This was a grave distortion of the historical facts. Tarnishing Comrade Zhou Enlai's bright image can never be allowed. During the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression," Comrade Zhou Enlai had more contacts with Li De, and I personally saw that Comrade Zhou Enlai time and again argued with Li De. Expressing his opposition to Li's military ideas at the Zunyi meeting, Comrade Zhou Enlai made a self-criticism of his mistakes in military command in his report on military problems and took responsibility on his own initiative. After Comrade Mao Zedong's speech, he firmly supported Mao's criticism of the mistakes of carrying out the line of pure defense in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression." In the meantime, he did his utmost to recommend and elect Comrade Mao Zedong as the leader of our party and army, and pointed out that unless the erroneous leadership was changed, there would be no hope for the Red Army and the revolution could never succeed. Comrade Zhou Enlai's proposal was actively supported by Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Liu Bochong, Li Fuchun, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Deng Xiaoping and other comrades. His magnanimity was admired and praised by most of the comrades who attended the meeting. His noble morality was shown in his modesty, and his ready acceptance of good advice is something we should forever respect and learn from!

We should also point out that Comrade Bo Gu displayed a certain democratic work style at the Zunyi meeting. He presided over the meeting and made a general report in which he defended his own mistakes, but he did not exploit his position to stifle other people's opinions. His activities after the meeting were also good. Some people tried to sow discord by saying to him that "power should by no means be handed over." He gravely refuted this wrong idea and said that since the Central Committee had made this decision, we should obey and carry it out.

How are we to answer the following question: What actually was the nature of Comrade Mao Zedong's election as the leader of the whole party at the Zunyi meeting, an event that Li De bitterly hated? Obviously, this was not a "sectarian struggle for power" as Li De calumnized, but the most historic choice made since the founding of the CCP. Comrade Mao Zedong won the confidence of the whole party by his wisdom, rich experience and outstanding achievements during years of prolonged heroic struggle. People had come to know Mao Zedong not only through victories but also through failures. As Lenin said, "A defeated army is quick to learn." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 4, p 185) This is

indeed a profound truth. It was precisely at this critical juncture, when the revolution suffered serious losses, that the Chinese communists and people selected Comrade Mao Zedong as their leader. This was a great and wise choice. It showed that our party had grown out of its immaturity and achieved maturity. Up to the present day, we have enjoyed the successful results of the Zunyi meeting. We should remember and be grateful forever for the Zunyi meeting. It is very wrong and extremely harmful that nowadays some people negate Comrade Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought because of his mistakes in his later years. At that time, establishing the leading position of Comrade Mao Zedong and marching under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought were the basic guarantees for our victory. Nowadays, the correct understanding of the historical position of Comrade Mao Zedong and the adherence to and development of Mao Zedong Thought still constitute the basic guarantee for our victory. This is an issue of tremendous importance. We must treat it seriously and we should never allow our minds to be confused by those who harbor evil intentions. This is an important conclusion that we should reach in our refutation of Li De's slander.

III

Li De also attacked us with respect to the military problems that the Zunyi meeting discussions centered on. He said that at the meeting "all the basic political problems were thrown aside" and that "the meeting even made no mention of the war of resistance against Japan--the future strategic target of the Chinese Red Army and the major slogan of the CCP and the revolutionary government for many years. The only item on the agenda of the meeting was to sum up the fifth campaign against Chiang Kai-shek's 'encirclement and suppression' and the first stage of the Long March, and Mao Zedong's criticism was entirely centered on the strategy and policies of the central Red Army, that is, on military problems exclusively."

What Li De said here was true: The Zunyi meeting did indeed center on criticizing and solving military problems and leave the criticism and solution of political problems untouched. Nevertheless, was it wrong to do so? History has proved that it was completely right to do so. This was the wise decision made by Comrade Mao Zedong and the Zunyi meeting based on a comprehensive study and consideration of the situation.

As Lenin pointed out, a true revolutionary "should be good at finding a particular link in the whole chain at every juncture and grasp it with all his might so as to have a firm grasp of the whole chain and make preparations for a smooth transference to the next link." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 3, p 526) What was the "particular link" at the time of the Zunyi meeting? It was the military problem, that is, the military mistakes committed by Li De and others in the fifth campaign against Chiang Kai-shek's "encirclement and suppression" and during the initial stage of the Long March. If this problem had not been solved, the central Red Army could not have existed, let alone advance. Only when this problem was solved could there be conditions and bases for the solution of other problems.

Take the resistance against Japan for example. True, it was a major political issue and the important content of the CCP's political line. However, what did we have to rely on to resist Japan? If we had relied solely on distributing

tracts and shouting slogans, we would never have succeeded. Many conditions were necessary for the resistance against Japan. The most important and the most basic of these conditions was the Red Army led by the CCP. At that time the party and the Red Army were on the verge of perishing owing to the mistakes in military leadership committed by Li De and others. Could the resistance against Japan be possible if the party and the Red Army were not saved? It was precisely for the preservation of the most important and most basic condition for resisting Japan and precisely for making the necessary preparations for resisting Japan that "all the efforts" of the Zunyi meeting were concentrated on solving the military problems. On the contrary, if the discussion of the problem on the resistance against Japan had been forcefully thrust onto the agenda of the Zunyi meeting, the result would only have been empty talk that would have solved no practical problems. Is this not as clear as daylight?

We should also point out that the restriction of criticism exclusively to the military problem and the avoidance of criticism of political problem was also an important guarantee for the victory and success of the meeting. The mistakes concerning the military problem had already been obvious at that time and had been realized by most of the comrades of the CCP Central Committee and its Political Bureau, who all demanded that the mistakes be corrected. The political problem, however, had not reached such a stage and was not realized by quite a few comrades. Therefore, they had to wait. In such a situation, if both military and political mistakes had been criticized, the political problem could not have been solved and the solution of the military problem would have been delayed. At the meeting there were indeed some people who suggested criticizing and correcting the political mistakes made since the 4th Plenary Session of the 6th CCP Central Committee. But Comrade Mao Zedong wisely put an end to this tendency. This was very wise. For only by so doing--by discussing only military mistakes but not political ones--could more comrades be united, and in short, could the solution of military problem that was most urgent be facilitated. From the above we can see that the focusing of all efforts at the Zunyi meeting on criticizing and solving the military problem was completely correct.

IV

"It is an idle boast that the fortified pass is a wall of iron; with firm strides we are crossing its summit." The Zunyi meeting dispersed the black clouds blotting out the sky over the Red Army and lighted the way for the Long March. After the Zunyi meeting, under the command of the CCP Central Committee and under the personal command of Comrade Mao Zedong, the Red Army was saved from its perilous situation and it successfully accomplished the great strategic task of moving to the north to resist Japan. But Li De said that after the Zunyi meeting, under the command of Mao Zedong and the military leading group, "the march more and more became a retreat and sometimes it became an actual flight," that "the Red Army took a winding route," and that "the troops sometimes marched side by side, sometimes advanced, sometimes retreated, sometimes flanked and made false attacks, and sometimes even went around in circles." He said that the military strategy and policies after the Zunyi meeting were wrong. This is also an awkward distortion and an abject attack.

Facts are more eloquent than words. We had better let facts assert themselves.

What was the most urgent problem after the Zunyi meeting? It was how to extricate the Red Army from the enemy's encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek had moved hundreds of thousands of troops to pursue and intercept the Red Army in an attempt to encircle and wipe out the Red Army in northern Guizhou south of the Changjiang River. The situation was highly dangerous. What could we do? Obviously, only the highly mobile and highly flexible guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, which had been constantly advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong, could save the Red Army from this most dangerous situation. This was the situation and task at that time. The meeting took a sober view of this, and in its "resolution" it clearly pointed out, "The key problem at present is how to overcome the enemy troops in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou and Chiang Kai-shek's troops. In order to overcome these enemy troops, the Red Army should be highly mobile" and the commanders at all levels should be good at "applying the tactics of highly mobile warfare." The reaffirmation and reapplication of guerrilla war and mobile war meant the reaffirmation of Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics. This was the great achievement of the Zunyi meeting.

Comrade Mao Zedong had deep strategic insight; in directing combat, he was flexible and never followed stereotyped conventions. What was most admirable in his directing of the war effort was that he not only could direct his own troops at will but was often very skillful in directing and moving the enemy troops. After the Zunyi meeting, he personally directed the battle of "crossing the Chishui River 4 times," which played a decisive role in saving the Red Army. The battle of "crossing the Chishui River 4 times" was a battle of highly mobile warfare. In accordance with Comrade Mao Zedong's command and planning, the Red Army moved to the south and north, to the east and west, and forward and backward. Full of vitality, it outflanked and thrust into hundreds of thousands of enemy troops and retained its initiative everywhere, while the enemy was completely confused and at a loss in which direction to move. Thus the enemy was in a passive position, was attacked everywhere and was fatigued from being moved around by us. What were the evils in "going around in circles"? As far back as the founding of the Red Army, Comrade Mao Zedong had put forth the idea of "employing the policy of circling around when pursued by a powerful enemy." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Vol 1, p 101) It was precisely by this highly flexible and mobile strategy and tactics of "going around in circles" that the Red Army ingeniously freed itself from the encirclement and interception of hundreds of thousands of enemy troops and achieved a decisive victory in its strategic transfer. The battle of "crossing the Chishui River 4 times" was a most admirable and magnificent chapter in the history of the Long March and it fully displayed Comrade Mao Zedong's brilliant military art. The commanders and fighters who took part in this battle still feel excited and are full of praise when they talk about it today.

Comrade Zhu De wrote a poem in memory of the Zunyi meeting, which reads: "The dragons danced in the sky because they had obtained a chief who knew the route well to lead them. Having someone to adjust the direction and height of their flight, they flew with ease in the boundless sky." This was the truth. It was precisely because of the wise leadership of the CCP Central Committee and

Comrade Mao Zedong that, after the Zunyi meeting, we preserved and tempered the backbone of the party and the Red Army, overcame Zhang Guotao's scheme of retreat and flight and of splitting the party, triumphantly reached northern Shaanxi, completed the Long March, enhanced the formation of the national united front for resistance against Japan and pushed the resistance movement to a climax. These are facts known throughout the world.

* * *

At the Zunyi meeting our party for the first time independently applied the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism in solving its own problems of line and policies. Its success profoundly revealed the important revolutionary truth that "the great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Vol 2, p 499) A party will be completely hopeless if it cannot integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice in its country in order to independently solve its own revolutionary problems, but instead entirely depends on foreigners or mechanically copies ideas from books or experiences from abroad. In the history of our party, Comrade Mao Zedong was the first to realize and practice this truth, and it was only after the Zunyi meeting that, owing to the establishment of Comrade Mao Zedong's leading position in the party Central Committee, this truth gradually became a guideline for the whole party. This was achieved through shedding the blood of countless people! Furthermore, this is the actual reason why the Zunyi meeting was of such great significance.

Immortal are the great achievements of the Zunyi meeting!

The Zunyi meeting will shine brightly forever!

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CORRECTLY IMPLEMENT THE REWARDS SYSTEM WITH THE OVERALL SITUATION IN MIND

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[Article by Commentator]

[Text] There is little doubt that the implementation of the rewards system has successfully aroused the enthusiasm of staff and workers and promoted the development of production. The problem worthy of attention at the moment is that the rate of increase of bonuses has far surpassed the increase in profits and the growth of labor productivity. If this problem is not earnestly solved, not only will it be detrimental to the overcoming of the nation's financial difficulties and to the smooth progress of the readjustment of the national economy, but also it will adversely affect the implementation of the bonus system itself. This problem is the result of many contributing factors. Regarding the issuance of bonuses, the following problems are the major ones which need to be solved:

I. Correctly Understand the Nature of Bonuses and Strictly Uphold the Criteria for Granting Bonuses

Bonuses are different from salaries and wages. The latter are the basic form of remuneration to staff and workers for their services or labor, and the former are supplementary remuneration. Bonuses are remuneration for above-norm labor; they are compensation to staff and workers for the mental effort and physical labor expended in doing above-norm work. Staff and workers who have completed their labor norm are entitled to their basic salaries or wages. They can receive bonuses only after they overfulfill the labor norm. The principle governing bonuses is distribution according to work: more above-norm work, more bonus; less above-norm work, less reward; and no above-norm work, no reward. These are the two basic points governing the granting of bonuses. Some comrades, finding the level of our salaries and wages rather low, turned to bonuses as a source of additional compensation. As a result, more and more bonuses were granted, sometimes even surpassing the basic pay level of the recipient. This should not have been the case. If the system of salaries and wages is not rational, it should be gradually improved on the basis of developing production and reforming the economy. There is no reason to provide alternative means by abusing the bonus system. This will only add to the difficulties in the future reform of the system of salaries and wages.

Originally the granting of bonuses was to rectify egalitarianism. Unfortunately, certain enterprises have resorted to egalitarianism in granting bonuses and, regardless of whether the labor norm has been exceeded or not, a set bonus is granted to everybody. In this way, bonuses have actually become "extra wages." This does not conform with the nature of bonuses and, in reality, adversely affects the proper functioning of the bonus system. Certain enterprises have unconditionally widened the scope of piece-rate wages and even resorted to such tactics as increasing overtime pay and, in this way, increasing bonuses in a disguised form. Other enterprises, trying to ensure that their staff and workers receive more bonuses, deliberately lower the labor norm or raise the unit pay for piece-rate wages. All these practices are directly opposed to the principle governing the granting of bonuses.

In order for bonuses to perform their normal function, the enterprises must fix a rational system of norms. Without such a system, there is no basis to judge whether the work has been overfulfilled or not and the granting of bonuses will have no functional basis to operate upon.

An enterprise has a number of norms. The most important one is the labor norm. It stipulates the volume of work a worker has to carry out within a time unit, or, in other words, the work time consumed in performing a certain task. The labor norm is the principal basis for determining the amount of bonus to be granted. The level of the norm is the criterion for whether the granting of bonuses is rational or not. If there is not an advanced or rational labor norm, or if the norm is too low, this will result in the excessive granting of bonuses or even in a loss of control in the granting of bonuses. Consequently, there will be a reduction in state revenue, which will adversely affect the national interests.

A norm which is advanced and rational must possess the qualities of being, on average, progressive, all-encompassing and stable. By being "all-encompassing" we mean that the norm must not only stipulate the quantity of products to be completed within a time unit but also specify the quality of the products and the quantity of materials to be consumed. In other words, in assessing whether a worker has fulfilled his norm or not, we must take into account not only the quantity of products turned out within the time limit but also whether the quality of the products conforms to the specifications and if economy has been practiced in the consumption of raw materials and materials. Only in this way can an enterprise obtain better economic results and render beneficial services to society. Because some enterprises have only a labor norm but no specifications for quality or consumption of materials, the quality of their products is likely to drop, the consumption of materials is likely to rise, the cost of production is likely to rise and the profit of the enterprises is likely to drop. This runs counter to the requirement that the norm have the property of being "all-encompassing."

A rational norm is the foundation for an enterprise to formulate its plans and to implement the economic responsibility system. At present, owing to the fact that a great majority of the enterprises have failed to control their norms in a sufficiently satisfactory manner, the scientific character of their planning has been adversely affected. For this reason, the internal assessment of the performance of workshops and of staff and workers should be based on the fulfillment

of the norms and also of the plans. As for the bonuses, if it is found that the administration of the norm is backward and that a progressive and rational system of norms is lacking, then it is necessary to install a measure of control over the granting of bonuses. The basic road to rationalizing the granting of bonuses is to reorganize the management of the enterprise and strengthen the norm system. If the norm of an enterprise is really progressive and rational, then, generally speaking, the sphere and extent of the bonuses will not be too large and the bonus given to the individual will not be higher than his basic salary or wage. This will also prevent the growth of egalitarianism.

II. Plan in an Overall Manner and Make the Level of Bonuses Correspond to the Development of Production

Bonuses and salaries or wages constitute the income of an individual worker. A rational level of bonuses is related to the correct handling of production and distribution as well as to the relationship between the state, the collective and the individual. Bonuses are not unlimited. There is a definite basis for the state's allocation of a definite amount of money for bonuses within a designated period and also a basis for determining the level of bonuses for profit-making enterprises.

First, the rate of increase in bonuses and in salaries and wages cannot exceed the rate of growth in labor productivity. The rate of growth in labor productivity indicates the degree of increase in the production of commodities for society, within a specified period, on the part of each worker. Generally speaking, the level of salaries and wages, and of bonuses, should rise concomitantly with the increase in labor productivity. But, because the production increase resulting from the increase in labor productivity cannot be devoted, in its entirety, to consumption by the individual worker and because a portion must be set aside and used to expand reproduction and meet other social needs, the rate of increase in salaries and wages and in bonuses must be lower than the rate of increase in labor productivity. If it is not, then society's development of production will be seriously affected.

Second, the bonuses and the salaries or wages of workers must be proportionate to the available supply of commodities. The salaries or wages and the bonuses constitute the purchasing power of society and there is a fixed ratio between social purchasing power and the available supply of commodities. If this ratio is upset and the people have too much money in their hands while there is an insufficient supply of commodities, then a tense situation in supply and demand will develop, commodity prices will rise and currency inflation will result. In order to raise the standard of living of the people and enable them to make use of their purchasing power, we must earnestly develop agriculture and the light industries in order to supply more commodities to the market. Concurrently, however, we must control the granting of bonuses so that the money in the hands of the people corresponds to the available supply of commodities. Hence, those enterprises which have granted excessive bonuses should bear in mind the long-term interests of the state and of the individual and revert to granting only suitable amounts of bonuses to individuals, retaining a portion of their profits for use in group welfare work. If this problem is not well handled and if there is an excessive granting of bonuses, then the amount of money in people's hands will exceed the

available supply of commodities, and the burden of the subsequent rise in commodity prices will eventually fall on the shoulders of the broad masses of staff and workers.

Third, the level of bonuses in individual enterprises must be in line with that of their neighboring enterprises. When determining its own level of bonuses, an enterprise should take the overall situation into account, pay due attention to other enterprises and should not fix its own level too high. This is because whether an individual enterprise is making a profit or not and how much profit it does make does not depend entirely on the efforts of the enterprise itself. It is subject to the influence of such objective factors as technological equipment, natural conditions, prices and taxation. The means of production of state-operated enterprises are owned by the whole people. Hence, in distribution we should, within the bounds of ownership by the whole people, in general strive to observe the principle of equal pay for equal work. There should not be too great a disparity in the level of bonuses between the individual enterprises.

Should all of the new value created by each individual worker be returned to him in the form of a bonus? No, this is not necessarily the case. The new value created by the above-norm work of each individual worker, like that created in other work, generally should first be subjected to deductions for reproduction expansion funds, for social welfare funds, for social reserves, for insurance funds, and so on. Only after such deductions have been made should the remainder be considered for distribution to staff and workers as bonuses depending on the quality and quantity of above-norm work. If such deductions were not made, then the development of social production would be adversely affected. Unfortunately, at the moment, certain enterprises have designated all the profits derived from production over and above plan or contractual obligations as bonuses to be distributed among their staff and workers. Such practices, which go against the interests of the state and of the collective, are extremely harmful to the development of socialist construction.

Some comrades are of the opinion that, since the allocation of bonuses depends on the size of the profits of an enterprise, it should follow that, if the profits of an enterprise are large, the amount of bonuses set aside should also be large and there should be no limit to the amounts staff and workers receive as rewards. Other comrades have expressed the belief that since bonuses are for above-norm labor, then regardless of how an enterprise fares as a whole in business operations, so long as an individual has done above-norm work he is entitled to a bonus. Neither of these viewpoints are comprehensive enough. How much an enterprise allocates for bonuses is determined by the condition of its fulfillment of the plan and on how much profit it has earned. Only when an enterprise has over-fulfilled the state's plan and made a profit, has it the right to collect the designated funds for above-norm labor bonuses. This is indeed a logical premise for an enterprise to use in granting bonuses to its staff and workers and is also the source of the bonus fund. If an enterprise has not fulfilled the state plan or has even accrued a deficit, then it has no right to demand from the state to be allowed to retain funds for bonuses. In turn, an enterprise is not entitled to grant any bonuses to its staff and workers when there is no source for such bonuses. Even though an enterprise is entitled to grant bonuses and to set up or replenish the bonus fund, it cannot, at one stroke, expend all it has in paying

out bonuses. On the contrary, it should "look ahead and behind" and make an overall plan. When its bonus fund is substantial, the enterprise should still try to restrict the granting of bonuses and add to the fund in order that when business conditions change and the bonus fund is at a low ebb, the fund will not be completely diminished. As for those enterprises which have failed to fulfill the state plan and have suffered losses in their operations, they are not entitled to grant any bonuses. In such enterprises, if the staff and workers have individually done above-norm work, they should be given moral encouragement and, in general, should not be granted bonuses. At the moment, some enterprises which have suffered financial losses still insist on granting bonuses. This, in reality, is spending the capital construction funds of the state. As for those enterprises which, owing to policy decisions, are losing propositions, bonuses may be granted for reducing the deficit or adding to the earnings of the enterprises. This is because the staff and workers have done above-norm work toward reducing the deficit and adding to the earnings of the enterprise.

III. Combining Bonus Work and Ideological-Political Work

In order for enterprise management to progress smoothly, the two wheels of the economic responsibility system and of ideological and political work must be set in motion. It must be acknowledged that an economic responsibility system can combine better the interests of the state, of the enterprise and of the individual. It can also change the situation in which the enterprise remains the same regardless of whether the management is good or not, whether the performance of its staff members is good or bad, or whether they have done more or less work. The system can also link power, responsibility and benefits. It can change the phenomenon of "eating out of one big pot." By means of material benefits, it can encourage both those enterprises which are eager to press forward and the diligent and hard-working staff and workers, and at the same time punish those enterprises which have done poorly and whose staff members are lazy. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that there are some enterprises which have over-emphasized the role of bonuses and consider material benefits as providing the sole motive force for arousing the enthusiasm of the staff and workers in production and work. This is the cause of many problems.

Where does the enthusiasm of the staff and workers in production and in work come from? In our country, an unending source of enthusiasm is found in the fact that the broad masses of staff and workers are the masters of the nation, that they fervently love the socialist motherland, that they earnestly desire the rapid transformation of the backward appearance of the motherland and its vigorous development, and that they are determined to realize the four modernizations. A contingent of staff and workers who are thoughtful and well-disciplined and who possess a high degree of spiritual civilization—this is what our socialist cause depends upon. In the building of a powerful socialist nation, we require a high degree of material civilization and also a high degree of spiritual civilization. The building of a spiritual civilization must rely on ideological and political work. The stress on ideological and political work and on creating a high degree of spiritual civilization for mankind does not refute the material interests of the broad masses of staff and workers. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "The basic principle of Marxism-Leninism calls for the masses to recognize their own interests and to unite together to struggle for their own interests."

("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Vol 4, p 1261) Material interests include the interests of the state, the interests of the collective and the interests of the individual. The task of ideological and political work is to educate and mobilize the broad masses of staff and workers, first of all, to protect the material interests of the state and of the collective. In turn, the state and the collective must protect the material interests of the individual and ensure that the staff and workers, based on their own material interests, become concerned with the development of the socialist cause.

Some enterprises have simply resorted to the granting of bonuses to stimulate the production enthusiasm of their staff and workers and have entirely neglected the political and ideological education of their staff and workers. In the short term and for a limited sector of production, this method might produce certain stimulating effects, but as a whole and in the long term, it might produce negative results. It will make people anxious to seek only money and to pursue individual material interests. It endangers the unity of the working class and corrupts their ideology. Our principle is that we must have bonuses in material terms but must also do well in our ideological and political work. We must advocate the communist attitude toward work and strengthen education on collectivism and patriotism. Concurrently with doing well the work of awarding of bonuses, we must also do well in ideological and political work in order for the granting of bonuses to be beneficial to the development of the contingent of staff and workers and also beneficial to the readjustment and reorganization of the economy. Only under the condition of having performed well ideological and political work can bonuses enable the broad masses of staff and workers to display their role as the masters of the nation and consciously make more contributions to socialism. All this has been verified by our past experiences.

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POSTSCRIPT TO 'A STUDY OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHINA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY'

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[Article by Xue Muqiao [5641 2550 2890]]

[Text] This is the postscript to the book "A Study of Questions Concerning China's Socialist Economy" written by Comrade Xue Muqiao, and it is carried first by this journal with his consent.

Two years have elapsed since the book "A Study of Questions Concerning China's Socialist Economy" was published. Several hundred millions of copies of this book have been printed, and it has also been published in English, Japanese, French and Spanish. Some publications at home and abroad have commented on this book, and the author has received many letters from readers. It was beyond the imagination of the author that the book, which probes the developmental laws of our socialist economy, would evoke such a widespread response. This shows that the socialist cause of China has increasingly drawn the interest of people both at home and abroad and that the comrades and the masses urgently demand the studying of and probing into the questions on the theories and policies of our socialist modernization program and that they hope to find answers, in various aspects of the book, to their problems.

With regard to this book, I mentioned in my "preface" and "postscript" that this book "can only be regarded as a draft," that "some practical experiences that have been summed up are still not recognized as theories; and that many views are not well developed or complete and, therefore, might not stand the test of practice." None of these statements were made out of modesty, but to simply state the facts. The reasons are that, on the one hand the author's understanding is limited and, on the other hand, because theory stems from practice and there is no end to practice, and consequently there will never be an all-encompassing theory.

Following the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee and after the restoration of social order, both the theory and the practice of our socialist construction have developed very rapidly. In order to be in accord with this development, the author compiled some articles and reports last September into the book "Some Questions on the Present Economy of Our Country" as a supplement to "A Study of Questions Concerning China's Socialist Economy" which was published a year earlier. People could see that, compared with the former book,

there had been much development and many changes in this collection of articles and reports. Following the publication of this collection, the author has made academic reports on many occasions and, in some aspects, these reports have, compared with the collection, made new progress (these reports will be compiled and published). This shows progress in the author's understanding, and this progress results from the political and economic development at home and abroad. There has been new progress recently in the political and economic situations at home. The most outstanding example is that our party convened the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, which is of far-reaching historical significance, and passed the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC." This "resolution" summed up, in an all-round way, the historical experiences of our party over the past 6 decades, affirmed the correct road for building a modern and powerful country, which had been gradually formed since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee and which is in accord with the situation of our country, and further pointed out the orientation for making continuous progress in our socialist cause and in the work of the party. Measured by the spirit of the "resolution," the basic orientation of this book is correct. But it is apparent that this book did not fully divorce itself from the leftist mistakes that existed for a long period of time in our party; on the contrary, it retained leftist traces in some aspects. For example, it did not explicitly explain the dialectical relationship between socialist production relations and the productive force, and in some places it prematurely stressed the necessity of making preparations for the transition to communism. This shows that the emancipation of the mind is an arduous process.

No major revision will be made to this book in the near future. Some theoretical questions (such as whether part of the labor power belongs to laborers and whether the renminbi will be linked to gold) have remained points of difference for many years in academic circles both at home and abroad. With regard to these questions, I still stick to my original views and I am willing to continue to discuss these questions together with comrades from academic circles, based on the principle of letting a hundred schools of thought contend. I simply want to make some revisions and supplementary explanations with regard to the current economic construction and particularly to the questions related to readjustment and restructuring.

I. Regarding the Concrete Forms of the Relations of Socialist Production

The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" points out: "The relations of socialist production do not develop in fixed forms, and our task is to meet the needs in the development of productive force in our country and create, at each stage, the concrete forms of the relations of production that are in line with that stage, in the interest of making continuous progress." This is a scientific conclusion based on the general summing up of the positive and negative experiences since the founding of new China with regard to the forms of the relations of socialist production.

Marx and Engels pointed out as early as more than 100 years ago that, during the first stage of communism--the socialist stage--the ownership of the means of production would be unified public ownership by the whole society. This prediction was meant to represent a general trend. Marx and Engels could not define,

and had no intention of defining, a concrete form of the production relations for the stage of socialism. The Great Socialist October Revolution took place in Russia, a country then dotted with many small factories. The practice of socialism has proved that socialism need not necessarily be based on unified public ownership by the whole society. The analysis made by Stalin, in regard to socialist ownership, was a contribution to Marxism-Leninism. But this analysis had the shortcoming of being too simple an explanation of the management of two different systems of public ownership. He was correct when he stressed the importance of planning in an economy with ownership by the whole people, but he neglected the roles of the law of value and the market. Consequently, under his leadership, there appeared a management form that was characterized by a high degree of state centralization mainly manifested in the form of administrative management. This management form was also considered to be the only applicable form for ownership by the whole people and, as a result, other management forms were excluded. With regard to the rural economy with collective ownership, only one form was permitted to exist and this form was the form defined by the agricultural labor regulations. On the other hand, the lack of balance in economic development was neglected and no attention was paid to flexible and multiform management.

Following the basic completion in our country of the socialist reform of the means of production with private ownership in our country, we also established two forms of public ownership. Because of the "leftist" mistakes, there appeared a tendency to blindly seek a high level of nationalization. This tendency ran counter to the law that production relations must accord with the nature of the productive force and, consequently, this hampered the development of the productive force. This has been an important lesson for us. Reality shows that the development of the productive forces in most countries, during the early stage of socialism, was in general far from balanced. In old China, the economic development among regions was seriously unbalanced. Without doubt, considerable improvement has been made in this aspect after more than 3 decades of construction, but the situation has yet to be basically changed. Now the development of the productive force in our country is characterized by varied forms. Some forms are modern and advanced mass production; some are mechanized production of the technical level of the 1940's or 1950's; some are semimechanized and semimanual production; some are completely manual small-scale operations; and some are ancient, primitive farming methods. The situations in different regions also differ widely from each other. The production levels in Shanghai and Guangzhou differ, by seemingly several centuries, from those in Qinghai and Xizang. The situations in rural areas and urban areas also differ from each other. The commodity economy in cities has developed considerably, but in many places in rural areas the agriculture-based economy is still predominant. The situations in different cities also vary. The socialized mass production in a few major cities such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai is quite advanced, but the level of most cities is not high. Even within the same city, the development of the productive force in different departments and different trades varies greatly. As the development of the productive force has resulted in varied situations, it is impossible to forcibly shape a single form of public ownership and, consequently, it is also impossible to introduce a single management form.

In our country, the means of production are a major component of the socialist public ownership system, and the state economy and the collective economy are basic economic forms. If this were not the case, our society could not be termed a socialist society. But, in accordance with the situations in our country, under the premise that public ownership remains the primary form, a few other economic forms should be permitted to exist. For example, a few individual economic undertakings must be allowed to exist. We still have a number of completely, or almost completely, manual trades. In some trades, collective management has more advantages than individual management, and in some other trades individual management is more beneficial. For example, some trades that are suitable for diversified management, such as repairing services and certain retail businesses, will be more flexible when they are operated by individuals because, in this way, they will be more convenient for customers. The economy of the self-employed, within certain limits, is a necessary supplement to the economy of public ownership.

In order to step up the development of the socialist economy, it is imperative to allow foreign capital to invest in our country in the form of joint ventures. Overseas Chinese must also be allowed to invest. Of course, certain forms of transitional ownership such as organizations like holding companies might be set up. But the number of such organizations must be limited. In short, ours is a vast country but it has a backward economy and unbalanced development. Therefore, it is impossible to establish a single socialist ownership form on this basis. We can only progress by making the economy of socialist public ownership the base and, at the same time, allow a few other economic forms to exist. Our socialist public ownership is very firm and, therefore, the existence of a few semisocialist or nonsocialist economic forms will not affect the predominant position of the socialist economy; neither will they affect the socialist nature of our whole economy. At the present stage of socialist construction, the only option open is to retain the enormous collective economy as the base and, under the strong guidance of the socialist state economy, allow on a limited basis other economic forms as supplements. This is in line with the development of the productive force.

The economy of socialist public ownership must have various and flexible management forms. The management of the economy of the ownership by the whole people also cannot be only of one form. That is to say, different trades and enterprises may have different forms of management. For example, some enterprises may carry out their business by fulfilling state production quotas, some may carry out their business according to market demands, some may carry out their business independently, and some may carry out their business by forming joint companies. They may form these companies with enterprises in other provinces and regions, and others may jointly run their business with units in the collective economy. In order to overcome the serious shortcomings of the state being responsible for profits and losses and of "eating out of the same big iron rice bowl," we have experimented over the past 2 years with various forms of the responsibility system for profits and losses. On the one hand, we have correctly handled the relationship between enterprises and the state and solved the problem of it making no difference whether enterprises were doing a good job or not. On the other hand, we have also correctly handled the relationship between enterprises and their staff and workers and implemented the principle of distribution according to work, thus solving the problem of it making no difference whether

staff and workers were doing a good job. Facts prove that, with the establishment of the responsibility system for profits and losses, the management form in which only the state is responsible for both profits and losses has been discarded in order to mobilize even better the initiative of enterprises and their staff and workers and to improve management and efficiently garner better economic results. But such a responsibility system must not be implemented in the manner of "one knife for everything," i.e., arbitrary uniformity. That is to say, we must introduce various forms and discourage all enterprises from following a single form in order to avoid limiting the objective requirements for development.

In particular, the management of the economy of collective ownership can in no way follow a single form. Take, for example, the collective ownership in rural areas. The size of units in rural areas might differ from each other, and thus the basic accounting units cannot be of one form. Various production teams may introduce various forms of the production responsibility system according to their specific conditions, and these forms must win the support of the masses. The various forms of the production responsibility system in rural areas have made rapid progress over the last 2 years. These forms include management of certain quotas, fixing job quotas for small groups, fixing farm output quotas for each group, fixing farm output quotas for individual households and assigning them full responsibility for task completion, unified management, assigning responsibility to each laborer, fixing production quotas for specialized teams and linking remuneration to output. All these forms are in line with a particular type of job and productive force, and they have a considerable effect on increasing production. Therefore, they are warmly welcomed by the masses of peasants. All these measures negate the various "leftist" methods, which lasted for many years, such as "headlong mass action," noting down "workpoints approximately" and "eating out of the same big iron rice bowl." All these methods are similar to those used in the development of the method of "3 fixes and 1 award," which was proven effective during the period of agricultural cooperatives, and they are also an important reform in the management work of the socialist collective economy. Readers can see that this book also deals with the agricultural production responsibility system, but in a fairly simple manner. The handling of this question was related to the development of the responsibility system at that time and with the level of the author's understanding at that time. For example, the explanation of fixing farm output quotas for individual households was more or less limited by the view that had been advocated for many years. At present, the agricultural production responsibility system is still developing. With the development of agricultural modernization, the forms of management of the collective economy will also continue to develop. It is also possible that various forms of economic cooperation and more management forms which will help demonstrate even better the advantages of the collective economy, might appear. A small number of individual undertakings are now allowed to exist in cities and, therefore, they should also be allowed to exist in rural areas. For example, a few individual households in some regions may be allowed to specialize in raising chickens, pigs, cows, or bees; they may also be allowed to work as carpenters or to produce bambooware and other sideline products. In deep forest areas it is possible for peasants and hunting households to engage in individual undertakings.

For a long time in the past, we considered the transition of the ownership by production teams to the ownership by production brigades, and then to the ownership

by the people's communes, as the only way for agriculture to evolve to the higher stage of socialism. But now this question must be reconsidered. As our agriculture is taking the road of modernization, it is only natural to develop a commodity economy and realize socialized production. Because they are "small and complete," individual peasant households are not in a position to specialize and coordinate. On the other hand, it is true that production teams, production brigades and people's communes have broken away from the limitation of individual households and have developed a certain division of labor and cooperation, but as they are "big and complete" they are still limited in developing specialized cooperation. With the development of diversified patterns of economic management in people's specialized production, some production may be jointly undertaken by production teams or people's communes. Some enterprises that are run by people's communes and production teams may jointly undertake production with state industrial and commercial enterprises. All this will break through the dividing line between people's communes and production teams and the dividing line between ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. On the basis of developing specialization and joint production, the production and exchange of commodities in rural areas will further develop in order to gradually promote socialized mass production. Therefore, in the development of collective ownership in rural areas some units may change from small collectives to big collectives, but in other areas such a transition may not be possible. On this question, the book only stresses the former and deals very little with the new forms of joint production.

Is it not violating the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific socialism to allow the existence of other economic forms during the stage of socialism? No. From the viewpoint of dialectic materialism and historical materialism, all things are in a process of development, and contain the remnants of the old and the seeds of the new. Historically, the so-called pure social form has never existed since the first appearance of primitive society. In the slave society there existed a great number of free men; in the feudal society there existed a great number of land-holding peasants who worked their own land; and in the capitalist society there exist a great number of small producers, and they still exist in a great number today, even in highly developed capitalist countries. People do not deny that such a society is a capitalist society just because it is not "pure." Why, then, should a socialist country be the "purest" of the "pure"? In upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, we must adhere to dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and proceed from the specific conditions in China to establish the concrete forms of the Chinese-style relations of socialist production.

II. Concerning the Planned Economy and Regulation by Market Mechanism

Ours is a socialist country in which the means of production with socialist public ownership are in a dominant position. Since most of the means of production belong to the state and the collective enterprises, it is possible and necessary to meet the objective needs in socialized production and carry out planned management of the national economy so that anarchy will be avoided in production and the economy will develop in a planned and proportionate way. This is the basic feature that differentiates our socialist economy from a capitalist economy.

Some economists have classified the socialist economy as a planned economy and the capitalist economy as a market economy. This definition does, in certain aspects, reflect the differences between the two systems but it is not a comprehensive explanation. This is because, at different times and in different places, the market economy of capitalist countries is subject to state interference to some extent when the state implements some guiding planning. Also, the planned economy of socialist countries does not dispose of the market. On the contrary, it makes wide use of the market, under the guidance of state planning.

In our study of the reform of the management system of our national economy over the past 2 years, we have often referred to the term "regulation by planning mechanism and regulation by market mechanism" (the author has also used this term). This term showed that we were not able to find a proper concept to express some economic processes. Now it seems that this term is not totally correct. The more correct concept is the one mentioned in the past by Comrade Chen Yun when he said: "Planned production is the prop of agricultural production, while free production, that is, production carried out according to market changes and within the scope of state planning, is a supplement to planned production." We must not regard planned management as the exclusive opposite of regulation by market mechanism. Apart from a few particularly important products that have to be made by directly planned production, most products may be made by indirectly planned production, and thus the fulfillment of the state plan will be assured by economic levers such as prices, tax rates and credit. It is not necessary for small commodities of many varieties to be included in state planning. They must be made according to market demand. Even if they are made by planned production, it is still necessary to consciously resort to the law of value, and use, to some extent, the roles of regulation by market mechanism in order to ensure that state planning does not depart from market requirements.

The main aim in implementing the planned guidance of the national economy is to correctly handle the relationship between state construction and people's livelihood and to coordinate the proportional relationship between and within various departments. According to our experiences over the past 3 decades, it is imperative for state planning to, first of all, pay attention to methods of controlling the scale of economic construction and of controlling the growth of social purchasing power. Not only is it necessary to maintain a proper ratio between these two; what is more important is that accumulation and consumption must be arranged in such a way that they will not exceed the total national revenue. It often happens that a socialist country wants to carry out economic construction more quickly and the result is excessive arrangements for accumulated funds that are beyond the supply capability of the means of subsistence. In this way, the accumulated funds and funds consumed will probably exceed the national revenue. In this situation, or in one where the amount of the national revenue utilized exceeds the planned national revenue, the country cannot help from relying on foreign loans, resulting in it shouldering heavy foreign debts. In another case, where the total amount of accumulated funds in the form of currency and funds consumed exceeds the supply of goods and materials in material form, a deficit will occur, followed by inflation and price rises, which will have serious effects, economically and politically. Therefore, in its economic work, a socialist country must strictly implement planned management in an effort to maintain a balance in financial revenue and expenditure, credit revenue and

expenditure, supply and demand of goods and materials, and revenue and expenditure of foreign exchange. This is the way to guarantee that the socialist economy will be able to develop smoothly.

In addition, it is particularly necessary for state planning to ensure that capital construction investments are rationally distributed among various economic departments so that the departments will be able to develop proportionately. The greater part of the capital construction investments must be put under centralized control by the state. The total amount of loans used by banks in economic construction must also be included in state planning, and the orientation of the use of these loans must be defined by the state. In distributing investment funds, we cannot lopsidedly pay attention to heavy industry and neglect other departments. For a long period in the past, we lopsidedly developed heavy industry and consequently put pressure on agriculture, light industry, communications, and commerce and service trades. The relations within heavy industry itself are out of proportion, and energy extraction falls behind. As a result, the various economic departments are seriously out of proportion. We must remember this lesson. Thus, because of this disproportion, it is now necessary for us to make more efforts to develop agriculture, light industry, energy, communications, building materials, commerce and service trades so that we will be able, as soon as possible, to regain and establish the rational proportional relations that accord with our country's situation.

When we are able to implement planned management that basically accords with reality, serious and chaotic economic conditions will not occur. Under this premise, we can expand the decisionmaking power of enterprises and resort to regulation by market mechanism as a way to supplement planned management or correct localized mistakes. The medium-sized and small enterprises that are characterized by complex products and that have closer relations with the market must be granted more decisionmaking power than big enterprises. We must implement indirect planning in medium-sized and small enterprises so that they will be able to bring into play even better the role of regulation by market mechanism. Experiences over the past 2 years have shown that, in order to bring into play the role of regulation by market mechanism, it is necessary for us to start by promoting circulation. This work includes:

First, change the monopolistic system in the purchase and sale of many products. Apart from major commodities such as grain, cotton fabrics, complete sets of equipment and some raw industrial materials that are in short supply, commercial departments must carry out purchase planning in regard to commodities according to market demand, and factories must carry out production planning according to the purchase planning of the commercial departments and according to market demand. Within the limits of state regulations, factories can directly trade in articles for daily use, marketing them where they are produced, without having to go through wholesale and retail outlets. Factories may also set up their own service departments to sell some products. In purchasing products, the commercial departments may refuse to purchase unsalable products and the producers of these products must be allowed to sell these products themselves. Practice has proved that such measures are in the interest of solving the problems of the shortages of some products and the stockpiling of other products, and it is in the interest of developing the socialist economy. In the past, the means of

production were allotted and transferred according to plan and were not available in the market. Some cities have now set up markets for trading the means of production and, apart from some goods and materials that come under unified distribution, all other products are traded. With regard to products that are in short supply, coupons may be issued to customers so that they will be able to purchase the products at their convenience. A number of factories have sold on the market products that have long been stockpiled and thus have decreased the stock of their goods, and this has helped to alleviate the tight supply of many products. We have not accumulated much experience in regulating the means of production by market mechanism, and there are still only a few trading places. Therefore, it is necessary for us to sum up experiences in this aspect in the future in order to find more and better methods.

Second, increase circulation channels and decrease circulation links. Socialist state commercial concerns must retain their market leadership, but they cannot monopolize the market. That is to say, apart from state commercial concerns, it is necessary to develop in a big way retail shops under collective ownership. Competition must be encouraged so as to change the "official commerce" work style. The socialist wholesale commercial concerns must also be transformed. According to the principle of economic rationality, wholesale markets must be set up in various places. This measure will help reduce the circulation links, break through administrative barriers and promote economic activity. A year ago, when I was speaking at a meeting of directors of commercial administrative bureaus, I pointed out that we must not prohibit the selling of products in distant places and that people's communes and production teams must be encouraged to collect native products and sell them to supply and marketing cooperatives or sell them in cities. Transporting to and selling products in distant places will inevitably give rise to speculation and profiteering. Therefore, when such a practice is permitted, it is necessary to step up market management. The purpose of such management is not to abolish regulation by market mechanism but to protect legal trading, develop regulation by market mechanism and curb illegal speculation. At present, there are still only a few markets for agricultural and sideline products in cities and, therefore, such markets must be developed in a big way. It is better to develop trading by peasants and peddlers than trading by people's communes or the collective commercial enterprises in rural areas. Some provinces and municipalities have accumulated good experiences in this aspect.

Third, gradually and properly relax price management. Apart from those products that come under unified state distribution, the other products require that measures must be taken to study and define the price management. Some places, and even enterprises, must be allowed a certain autonomy to readjust prices or to introduce floating prices within certain limits or to supply those products that are included in planning purchasing at negotiated prices. For many commodities there must be price differences in different seasons and in different regions so as to encourage the regions to regulate surpluses and shortages. The differences in quality and price must be expanded so that the products of various factories can compete in the market; the prices of products in short supply can be increased a little and the prices of those in excessive supply can be lowered. New products must be permitted to be trial-marketed at higher prices and stockpiled goods can be sold at reduced prices. Handling stockpiled goods in this way

must be systematized and must be included in the financial planning of the enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises must no longer be allowed to ask for subsidies from financial departments in order to avoid having some of their products become mildewed and rotten because of long periods of stockpiling. In short, the price management system that has been implemented must, under the premise of a stable economy, be reconsidered in an all-round way and plans must be worked out to take measures necessary to gradually reform the system.

In bringing into play the role of regulation by market mechanism, it is also necessary to take many other measures (such as readjusting tax rates and bank credits), and all these measures can only be effected through practice. In this respect, I am only putting forth some of my major thoughts and it is impossible for all these thoughts to be introduced now.

Implementing a planned economy on the basis of public ownership and bringing into play the auxiliary role of regulation by market mechanism are in line with the management system of our national economy. These measures differ from the economic systems with a high degree of state centralization and those with administrative methods as a major component; they also differ from the economic systems characterized by paying attention to regulation by market mechanism and neglecting planned management. The system mentioned above is the orientation for transforming the system in future.

III. Concerning Readjustment and Restructuring

At the meeting on the work of the party Central Committee that was held in April 1979, our party put forth the principle of "readjusting, restructuring, reorganizing and upgrading" the entire national economy in an effort to resolutely correct the mistakes in economic work over the previous 2 years and correct the leftist mistakes that had existed for a long time. Of these components--readjusting, restructuring, reorganizing and upgrading--we must at present stress readjustment.

By readjustment we mean that the proportional relations between accumulation and consumption and between various economic departments such as agriculture, light industry and heavy industry must be gradually rationalized so as to improve economic results. To attain this goal, it is imperative to reduce investment in capital construction. But not all people understand the significance of this readjustment. In particular, some foreign friends have failed to understand this. Some hold that a great reduction of investment in capital construction shows that we are not farsighted; others, upon hearing that we intend to strictly control national economic construction projects, hold that we have failed to transform the economic management system, that we have turned back to the old road of a high degree of centralization and denied regulation by market mechanism. Such doubts stem from the fact that they do not understand our economic system and economic structure; neither do they understand that the economic difficulties we are facing now differ from those of capitalist countries.

Both our country and capitalist countries are having economic difficulties, but these difficulties are of different natures. The difficulties of the capitalist countries are that demand by those able to buy has decreased, causing production

surpluses. Therefore, it is necessary for these countries to resort to various policies, including inflation, in a bid to encourage investments and slow down the arrival of a crisis. Our economic difficulties have been caused by excessive investment in economic construction, by excessive increases in social purchasing power and by the growth of demand surpassing the growth of production. As a result, most of the means of production and consumer goods are in short supply. Therefore, what we need to do is not to encourage investments but to reduce them. We must also prevent social purchasing power from increasing too rapidly. Measures have been taken over the past 2 years to reduce investment in economic construction, increase wages and raise the prices paid for agricultural products so as to improve the people's standard of living. Such measures are correct. But because the leftist ideas, which existed for more than 2 decades in economic work (high speed and high accumulation which exceed objective reality), have not been corrected, we have failed to curtail capital construction. On the other hand, in improving the people's standard of living, we have diverged from the original plan, because the improvement in the people's standard of living was too slow over the past 2 decades. This resulted from the growth of social purchasing power exceeding both the growth in production and the growth in the supply of commodities. That was why, although the production situation was excellent over the last 2 years and the people's standard of living improved considerably, there occurred high deficits and prices soared because more currency had been issued. Therefore, at present, our main measure to overcome economic difficulties is to strive to basically eliminate deficits, curb inflation and stabilize market prices. Of course, readjustment is not limited to these aspects. From a long-term view, we must continue to readjust the proportional relations between various economic departments, and the several hundreds of thousands of enterprises must be transformed and reorganized and must carry out technical innovation to improve their economic results. Following this readjustment, we will be able to form a comparatively rational economic structure and the entire national economy will be able to advance along the correct road of the socialist modernizations in line with our national conditions.

In his book, the author tentatively probed the relationship between readjustment and restructuring. Readjustment and restructuring must complement each other, but they are contradictory in some aspects. "In short, readjustment must come first and then restructuring. Readjustment must be carried out during restructuring and restructuring must be carried out during readjustment." This is basically correct. First of all, restructuring is inevitable. In the early days, following the founding of new China, we used the complete economic management system in the early 1950's which we had learned from the Soviet Union. This system was characterized by a high degree of centralization of the party Central Committee and localities and, in particular, enterprises virtually had no decisionmaking power. The profits of enterprises had to be handed over to higher authorities, investments were allotted by financial departments, and funds for renewing equipment and technical innovation had to be requested from financial departments. Products were turned out according to state planned production and they were all sold by state commercial departments. Factories had no direct relations with markets. Consequently, a number of products had no market demand. Commerce in cities was monopolized by state commercial departments and commerce in rural areas by supply and marketing cooperatives. Price control was too stringent. This system easily gave rise to serious bureaucracy and enormous

waste. Therefore, we will not be able to make progress without restructuring. But we cannot restructure too hastily. We must carry out experiments so that we will gain experience and make steady progress. The primary task at present is to readjust the national economy, and restructuring must serve and promote readjustment, which is the main thrust. The experiments and preparations for restructuring must be made actively, but at present there are no conditions to carry out this work in an all-round way. This does not mean that this work cannot be carried out. The restructuring that is in the interests of readjustment must be actively carried out (for example, the allotment of funds for capital construction can be changed to bank loans); the restructuring that is not in the interests of readjustment must be limited. In general, we must carry out the restructuring that is in the interests of readjustment and must control that which is not in the interests of readjustment. By so doing we will be able to enhance the completion of readjustment instead of hampering its development.

Readjustment and restructuring will have the same goal for a long period of time to come and they should rely on each other. For example, the system of unified revenue and expenditure, "eating out of the same big iron rice bowl," separating regions and departments and disputing over trifles, which have long obtained among us, must not remain unchanged, even if it is impossible to thoroughly carry out restructuring at present. Otherwise, we will not be able to fully mobilize the initiative of enterprises and their staff and workers, stop waste and improve economic results, and consequently we will not be able to fulfill even better the tasks of readjustment. In order to ensure stable prices and employment, it is also impossible at present to basically restructure the present irrational price system and irrational labor and wage systems, but in the future these systems will undoubtedly be restructured. Under the current price policies, the prices of products that require a long time to produce are higher and have larger profits, but the prices of those produced quickly are low and their profits are low or they even incur losses. This situation is not in the interests of rationally readjusting various trades and products; it is also not in the interests of the proportionate development of the national economy. If we do not restructure the labor system, this will be detrimental to solving employment problems, restructuring the management of enterprises, increasing labor productivity and improving economic results. Therefore, under the premise of making clear what is to be done first and what is to be done second, we must combine readjustment and restructuring so that they complement each other. When we have made achievements in readjustment, we can step up restructuring so that this work can be progress from part to whole.

I have written several articles on readjustment and restructuring. New situations have occurred and new problems have arisen, and they must be studied in practice. But I am not ready to discuss at length this question.

Let me take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all the comrades and friends who have given their comments and opinions following the publication of this book. Many letters have also been received, and I am sorry that I am unable to answer all the questions because of limited time.

WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN BY SICHUAN'S VICTORY IN ANTIFLOOD AND RELIEF WORK?

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 31-34

[Article by Du Xinyuan [2629 1800 3293]]

[Text] This year's flood in Sichuan, the worst in 100 years, has attracted considerable attention both inside and outside China. Faced with this serious natural disaster, our party, army and people have passed a severe test.

During a 60-day period between the end of June and the beginning of September, Sichuan Province suffered six heavy rainstorms and serious flooding. In all, 138 counties (cities and districts) were affected by the flood, with 57 county seats being inundated and about 20 million (over 20 percent of the province's total population) touched by the disaster. The flood area included about 17 percent--17.56 million mu--of the province's total area of farmland, most of which was both level and fertile cultivated land. Over 3,115 mining and industrial enterprises had to close down because of the flood. The flood also affected over 10,000 primary and middle schools, damaging up to 2.56 million square meters of school buildings. Services on the Chengdu-Chongqing, Chengdu-Baoji and Chengdu-Kunming railroad lines were suspended several times, and 523 major roads were cut by the flood. In all, the Sichuan flood probably caused over 2.5 billion yuan worth of direct economic damage and disturbed the production of about 3 billion jin of grain.

In face of this serious disaster, the party, government, army and people of the whole province managed (thanks to the profound concern of the party Central Committee and the State Council and also to their own arduous struggle) to deal with the emergency and combat the flood waters. The eventual victory over the flood was followed by a committed struggle to revive production and rebuild villages and towns. This was a great victory in antiflood and relief work. As this year's harvest of the main spring crop, paddy rice, was successfully completed before the flood, this year's harvest of 1.5 billion jin was higher than last year's, and there is hope that, as far as overall grain production is concerned, it might be possible to maintain last year's level. Moreover, it is estimated that the total value of this year's agricultural production will be 3 percent higher than last year's. By the beginning of August, 96.8 percent of the more than 3,000 industrial and mining enterprises shut down because of the flood had resumed production; 84 percent of these enterprises had even managed to match or exceed their predisaster production level. For the month of September the

total value of industrial production was 5.7 percent higher than during the same month last year. It is estimated that the total value of this year's industrial production might be the same as, or very close to, last year's record high level. Train services on the Chengdu-Chongqing, Chengdu-Baoji and Chengdu-Kunming lines have been resumed. Furthermore, proper arrangements have already been made for the 1 million flood victims rescued from danger; each person has a guaranteed daily ration of 1 jin of grain, and 60 percent of these victims have already either had their houses rebuilt or been given newly constructed houses. Efforts to prevent and cure illness and to disinfect the flood area have been stepped up, and thus far there have been no cases of serious contagious disease. The transfer of students to nearby schools, the merging of schools, the rental of buildings and the construction of temporary classrooms have enabled 95 percent of primary and middle school students in the flood area to start school on schedule. At present, the people of the whole province can enjoy relative security; prices have remained basically stable and social order is free from disturbance.

In preliberation history, no example of such a rapid resumption of agricultural and industrial production exists; neither was there ever such a successful reorganization of the people's livelihood after a major disaster. Works relating to Sichuan's history record that when a natural disaster struck "the land was swarming with refugees, crying and moaning with hunger, screaming piteously for food"; the disaster victims, "bring along the old, and the young, carrying bags and baskets, can be heard crying and shouting all day long and throughout the night; destitute, homeless and in ill health their suffering was too much to bear." In the flood that hit the area in 1945 over 1,000 people drowned in Hechuan County alone; once the flood had passed another 1,000 people died of disease and for 2 months the county town remained deserted. In today's disaster area the masses can be heard repeating the phrase: Whereas a flood in the old society was always followed by extortionate rents, high interest, disease and robbery, as soon as flood began here the leading cadres and People's Liberation Army arrived on the scene; state support came, medical teams came, and groups expressing the concern and sympathy of the central authorities came. There really is a world of difference between the old and new societies!

Facts prove that our party maintains flesh and blood ties with the people and works wholeheartedly and sincerely to serve the people; moreover it is a party with great fighting power. The PLA certainly is the people's own army; it is a great army which loyally defends the people and socialist reconstruction. Our people are a great people who believe wholeheartedly in the party, ardently love the motherland and have a strong sense of being masters of their own affairs. The victory of antiflood and relief work in Sichuan is an irrefutable fact that forcefully demonstrates the incomparable superiority of the socialist system.

I

The main reason for this great victory in antiflood and relief work was the unity of all levels of the Sichuan party organization. Dedicated heart and soul to the same cause, they took decisive and effective measures and went to the frontline to lead the masses in their struggle against the flood. On the second day of a heavy rainstorm in the middle of July, leading comrades from the provincial party committee and the PLA Chengdu Units visited the flood site and, thanks to their

firsthand understanding of the situation, they were able to make prompt arrangements for antiflood and relief work. On the third day they traveled along the Tuo, Fu and Jialing Rivers by plane, examining the flood conditions in the large area of western, eastern and central Sichuan. Following this, the leading comrades of the provincial party committee, the people's government, and the PLA Chengdu Units visited different flood areas, expressing their sympathy for the masses, making arrangements for their well-being and giving on-the-spot instructions on how to deal with the emergency and combat the flood. The important responsible comrades in each city, prefecture and county all went to the front-line and struggled shoulder to shoulder with the masses. Some comrades fought on for 40 or more hours without any sleep; others, disregarding the personal danger involved, plied small boats and rafts to lead emergency relief squads through treacherous waters that brought people to safety. When the Jintang county seat on the outskirts of Chengdu was turned into a large expanse of water on 13 July, the municipal party committee's secretary, who is more than 60 years old, traveled through the night to get there in time. In the middle of the journey his car was held up by the water but he continued on by foot through the water, using a bamboo pole to feel his way. When he arrived at the communications tower of the anti-flood command post on the following morning, deep water prevented him from getting into the building so the old secretary proceeded to drag his exhausted body up a rope that had been thrown down from the roof of the building. After climbing to the top, he immediately threw himself into the intense battle. The people who witnessed this spectacle were moved to tears of gratitude. Before the peak floodwaters hit Hechuan County, the local party committee organized the evacuation of the town's 60,000 people to safe ground. The county party committee building, the offices of the county government, and the houses of the party secretary and the head of the county were all on relatively high ground and were used as a temporary refuge for the flood-stricken masses. People pulled at the secretary's arm and were so overcome with gratitude that they didn't know what to say. The county party committee secretary comforted everyone, saying, "We're all one big family here!" This single sentence expresses the intimacy of the relationship between the masses and the cadres. When 500 members of the Changjiang production brigade of Tangjia commune in Suining County were trapped by floodwater, the party secretary led the way in organizing the commune's cadres and young members to form a long human chain that could safeguard the old, the weak, women and children from danger. They held on in the floodwater for 1 day and 2 nights after which the masses were able to escape from danger.

In this extraordinary struggle to overcome the flood and rescue people, the members of the Sichuan party organization at all levels fought together fearlessly without regard for their own lives and without distinctions of either age or position, clearly demonstrating the party's tight organization, discipline and militancy as well as the Communist Party members' lofty character. Greatly moved, the masses declared that, "Only since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, with the restoration of the old tradition of party cadres feeling sympathy for the people, has such a majestic scene of thousands upon thousands of Yu the Great's [Yu: reputed founder of the Xia dynasty, 2205 B.C.] controlling the waters of Shu been possible." The reaction of the masses demonstrates how our party's excellent traditions have been both restored and developed; it also provides a good answer to people who are accustomed to "looking askance" at the party's image.

II

The victory of antiflood and relief work in Sichuan cannot be separated from the vigorous support of the PLA units stationed in Chengdu. When floodwaters seriously threatened both life and property the commanders of the PLA units in Chengdu bravely led the way, bearing the heavy burden of the antiflood rescue effort. A large number of PLA commanders rushed to the disaster areas to assist the desperate masses and salvage state property. They also helped the masses to resume production, to rebuild their houses, and to prevent and cure illness. This demonstrated the affection and concern the army has for the people and wrote a new chapter in the army's history of supporting the government and cherishing the people.

Under the leadership of the PLA Chengdu Units' CCP Committee, the PLA in Sichuan mobilized more than 100,000 men, 44 aircraft, 7,149 vehicles and 190 boats to help rescue more than 43,000 disaster victims and save 100,000 tons of goods and materials. The military commanders promoted the slogan, "a disaster area is a battlefield"; fearing neither adversity nor personal sacrifice, they launched a stubborn and heroic struggle against the floodwaters. Wherever there were people trapped by the flood, the PLA would be there to help rescue them; wherever state or communal property was threatened by floodwater, the PLA would be there to help move the property to safety. There were numerous examples of such heroic and moving deeds. After struggling for a night and day in water that came up to their chests, the cadres and soldiers of a "Red Army group" stationed in Tongliang County hurried to Tongnan and Hechuan Counties. For 3 days they fought in three separate counties and covered several hundreds of li on foot. Even though some comrades were so tired that they were beginning to spit blood, they steadfastly refused to leave the "line of fire"; others suffered shock, but after being revived pitched into the work again. The masses offered encouragement, saying, "Those who fight battles are heroes, and those who rescue the people from disaster are also truly brave." Throughout the rescue operation the PLA observed strict discipline, continually set an example, and rigorously implemented the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention. In order to assist the disaster victims some army units transported large quantities of biscuits, canned food, fruit and other foodstuffs, going whole days without worrying about eating a single meal. Comrades who carelessly damaged other people's property immediately paid compensation. These model deeds silently educated the masses and reproduced the glorious traditions of the old Red Army, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Furthermore, they embodied the Lei Feng spirit of the new generation. The masses in the disaster area said with deep feeling, "Before liberation when there was a flood, the KMT army would come to rob the common people; now when the people suffer a disaster the PLA comes to rescue the common people. The PLA is much better!"

III

Another reason for the victory in antiflood and relief work in Sichuan was the high level of socialist consciousness among the people. This meant that the intelligence and strength of the people could be brought into full play. Faced with calamity, the people united in battle for the sake of the cause; they placed the general good above their own personal interests, and supported and helped each

other. In doing so they embodied the glorious spirit of patriotism, love for the community and self-sacrifice. The shipping companies in the disaster area give a classic example of subordinating the part to the whole. Most of these shipping companies are managed collectively. Having very insubstantial resources, some of them must rely on various forms of secondary business to pay salaries. Since they are all situated on the banks of rivers, as soon as a flood comes they are the first to be hit. However, when floodwater engulfed the region, these companies did not immediately start to worry about their own enterprises' property or even the safety of their own families. Instead, they concerned themselves with the general situation and, under the united guidance of the antiflood and relief command, set about rescuing people whose situation was particularly dangerous and moving the most important articles of state property to safety. The Tongnan County Shipping Company rescued over 3,000 people while the company itself suffered damage worth over 3 million yuan because rescue efforts were too late. A member of the CYL from the Xintong commune in Suining County sacrificed 10,000 yuan worth of his own family's property in order to rescue commune members.

When 1 person fell victim to the disaster 8 persons would come to the rescue. This is one of the particularly outstanding aspects of the antiflood and rescue work; it manifests the new type of relationship that exists in a socialist society between one enterprise and another, and between one person and another. The Neijiang Cotton Textile Mill was particularly hard hit by the flood disaster. Because the factory's equipment and stocks were completely inundated, it was difficult for it to resume normal production once the flood had ended. Immediately, 55 units belonging to the provincial textile industry and various units from neighboring provinces came forward, offering different forms of assistance and support. Thanks to the arduous struggle of the workers and staff, production was resumed 1 month earlier than had been originally planned. In the villages a policy of commune assisting commune, brigade assisting brigade, relatives assisting relatives, and neighbors assisting neighbors was widely promoted. The help given to disaster victims by those unaffected by the flood, and the assistance given to victims seriously affected by the flood by those less seriously affected, promoted the rapid reconstruction of houses as well as the replanting of late autumn crops. Numerous moving examples have enabled the broad masses of workers and peasants to deeply understand that not only must the nation follow the socialist road in order to find a way out but also that only by relying on socialism can the individual lead a happy life. An 81-year-old retired worker from the Chengdu No 2 Printing Plant led a frugal life and had managed to save 53,000 yuan to be used in an emergency. The antiflood and relief work made him realize that to depend on socialism is better than to depend on the individual, and he insisted on giving all his life savings to the factory to help restart production. The comrades in the factory were left with no choice but to solemnly accept the money and use it to establish a fund for rewarding advanced workers. Facts prove that the people have been nurtured by Mao Zedong Thought and that the level of socialist consciousness is very high. Although the 10-year period of chaos caused some damage to the spirit and soul of the people, the principles of socialist morality are still firmly embedded in the hearts of the people. We deeply believe that, under the correct leadership of the party, the socialist thinking and spirit of the people will, in accordance with the development of material and spiritual construction, continue to flourish and develop. Our nation's people will have the lofty spirit, values, ideals and morality of communism and will be able to stand upright in the world.

IV

The victory in antiflood relief work has made us realize that the orientation and the policy of our party since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee are our most effective spiritual weapons in our struggle against all hardships and difficulties. The third plenary session reaffirmed the party's ideological line of seeking truth from facts, and emphasized the need to proceed from actual conditions, to respect objective laws and to enhance revolutionary vigor. In the face of natural disasters, we oppose the mistaken leftist tendency of the past to ignore objective reality and overstate man's subjective initiative, and also oppose the mistake of repudiating man's revolutionary spirit by constantly stressing only objective difficulties. Only by truly respecting the objective rules and encouraging the revolutionary spirit were we able to overcome the natural disaster which confronted us. For example, workers in meteorology and hydrology focus on weather predictions and flood forecasts. Meteorologists carefully study the sky and clouds in order to forecast the arrival of heavy rainstorms; hydrologists, working on flooded rivers, brave wind and rain and risk their own safety so as to be able to quickly relay accurate information to flood forecast stations further down the river; this information tells people in the lower reaches of the river when the flood peak will arrive and what the expected water level will be. After receiving hydrologic reports, the party committee in Hechuan County quickly issued a map listing the height above sea level of the principal roads and communes. This enabled the masses to know in advance where there might be a flood and the possible depth of this flood. Efforts were also made to transfer the masses to safe ground. Without such a rigorous scientific attitude and without this revolutionary spirit of serving the people, would it still have been possible to reduce the flood damage to a minimum by organizing and mobilizing the masses and moving them to safe ground and by shifting important articles of state property before the flood actually arrived? Clearly, this would have been impossible. Therefore, basically speaking, the victory of the antiflood struggle is also the victory of the third plenary session's ideological line of seeking truth from facts.

Over the past few years we have resolutely acted in the spirit of the central authorities and have gradually eliminated leftist errors from our guiding ideology. In the villages the economic policy has been relaxed, the production responsibility system has been introduced and we have implemented the policy of "storing grain among the people." In the factories experiments have been carried out that allow each enterprise greater power and independence. Successive years of good harvest have increased the income of commune members, benefiting both the individual and the collective. This has provided a certain foundation on which to base efforts to solve problems such as food, clothing and shelter in the flood-stricken areas, and it has also provided the necessary conditions for a rapid recovery of the disaster area. Without the historic change in the course of events that has taken place since the third plenary session, we would still be promoting the leftist line, forcing both commune members and individuals to be nothing more than "empty skeletons"; the consequences of such a serious disaster as this would be unthinkable. Some of the commune members have said, "We don't care how extensive the damage might be, as long as we have the people and a policy, it will be possible to conquer any problem." This statement merits serious attention. On the one hand, it expresses the faith the people have in

the party Central Committee's policy; on the other hand, it encourages us to be more resolute and unbending in our efforts to implement the party Central Committee's general and specific policies.

Thanks to the guiding spirit of the party Central Committee's third plenary session, we have managed to gradually liberate our thinking from leftist restrictions and have been able, in the face of a major calamity, to take a series of special and flexible measures. As a result, the initiative of the masses has been brought into full play, and efforts to encourage the masses to help themselves by engaging in production have been successful. Output targets were promptly adjusted in each area in accordance with the flood conditions in the area, allowing commune members to work hard and still retain produce once the quota had been fulfilled. In areas in which crops had been destroyed by the flood, specific job assignments were arranged for the planting and harvesting of autumn crops. In areas where the soil had been washed away by floodwater, similar methods of providing work as a form of relief were adopted, and commune members were organized to carry out reclamation work. State purchase quotas, agricultural taxes and sideline occupation taxes were all readjusted in the disaster area. The party's policy greatly encouraged the masses to restore production and launch a vigorous campaign throughout the province's disaster areas for self-reliance and self-help. In agriculture, 5 million mu of late autumn crops were crash-sown in place of other crops, and 500,000 mu of cultivable land destroyed by the flood was either repaired or fully restored. Many communes increased their members' income and reduced the state's burden by promoting diversification and greater sideline production. In industry, efforts were made to further implement and improve the system of economic responsibility, to adjust the relevant policies and to bring the workers' initiative into full play. These measures both accelerated the rate of recovery of enterprises damaged by the disaster and contributed to the economic development of the whole province.

While antiflood and relief work have already achieved great victories, we are still faced with many problems: to thoroughly eliminate the consequences of the disaster still requires several years of hard work.

Guided by the spirit of the party Central Committee's sixth plenary session, we vow to conscientiously sum up our experiences and lessons and to work solidly to complete this task!

CSO: 4004/9

CONSCIENTIOUSLY OVERCOME LIBERALIZATION TRENDS IN LITERARY AND ART WORK

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 35-38

[Article by Sha Tong [3097 4547]]

[Text] At present, the vast number of literary and art workers are conducting criticism and self-criticism on the various manifestations of bourgeois liberalization in works of literature and art. This is absolutely necessary for ensuring the sound development of our literary and art cause along the road of serving the people and socialism. For this reason, it is appreciated by the broad masses of the people.

In order to overcome the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization we must recognize it and face it squarely. Bourgeois liberalization appears as an ideological trend before us. Its substance is to negate and oppose the four basic principles under the banner of "absolute freedom." Its core and essential aspect is to depart from the socialist path, break away from party leadership and lead people toward bourgeois liberalization and individualism. Does this ideological trend also find expression in literary and art works? The answer is in the affirmative.

The tendency toward bourgeois liberalization in our work in the literary and art field is primarily manifested in the departure from the principle of party spirit and from the party's policy stand in political matters. Examples are: to regard the four basic principles as "forbidden zones" and clamor about "breaking through" them; to regard the just demand that we attach importance to the social effects in the creation of literary and art works as "restriction" on creative writing; to advocate that the party should leave literature and art alone, maintaining that literature and art would be hopeless if controlled by the party; to preach the bourgeois theory of human nature and theory of human rights, clamor for the so-called "man's value," "man's dignity" and "man's liberty" and describe socialism as a system which "inhibits human nature"; and to spread ideas showing skepticism and discontent toward the socialist system among the young people in the name of discussing poetry. Are these manifestations not the precise reflections of bourgeois liberalization?

Although the situation is a little more complicated with literary and art creations, the existence of the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization is an undeniable fact just the same. First, there are some works which shamelessly reveal the erroneous trend of violating the four basic principles. The film

script "Unrequited Love" is a prominent representative work. Other than this, there are also some so-called political lyrics. In the name of opposing feudalism, some of these poems describe our achievements in socialist construction in the decades since the founding of the People's Republic as the mere erection of "another horrible shrine," thus seriously distorting the interrelationship between the party and the leaders on the one hand and the masses of the people on the other and seriously distorting the position and role of the masses of the people under the socialist system. Some of them use the classic line "one general achieves renown over the dead bodies of 10,000 soldiers" as the theme to distort the character of the people's war and the people's soldiers. Second, there are those works which have the exposure of the seamy side of life as their main theme. Adopting the erroneous stand and attitude and disregarding the effects they have on society, these works spread pessimistic views and sentiments of despair and make it impossible for people to see the bright and positive forces. For example, we have a few works about the "Great Cultural Revolution" which display nothing but brutality, ignorance, cruelty and ugliness. In these works, not a word was said about the party which not only has not been destroyed but has managed to remain united, nor about the people who are still upholding the foundations of the socialist system, nor about the arduous and unremitting struggle waged by the party and the people against leftist mistakes and the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique. Rather than giving people confidence, courage, strength and a sense of direction, such descriptions can only breed discontent and shake the socialist system. It is doubtful whether they can actually expose the crimes of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing clique, to say nothing of the fact that they have failed to draw a clear line of demarcation politically between the crimes of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing clique, including their efforts to push the deification movement, and the errors committed by Comrade Mao Zedong in his later years. Third, there are also some romantic pieces that show unhealthy ideological trends. They take great pains to describe lovers teasing each other, give expression to the bad taste of vulgar love and cook up bizarre plots that are divorced from actual life to serve this purpose. These works, which cater to the vulgar taste of a small number of people, cannot foster noble feelings or produce any desirable social effects. On the contrary, they can only lead people, especially the young ones, to concern themselves only with the small world of their personal life in disregard of the future of the motherland and the destiny of the nation. Such a tendency is one of the roots that breed political and moral degeneration as well as skepticism about and a wavering of confidence in the party and socialism.

With respect to literary and art theories, the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization is chiefly manifested in the erroneous attitude toward the Marxist theory and Mao Zedong Thought on literature and art. Whether to uphold or to disregard the Marxist theory and Mao Zedong Thought on literature and art as the guiding ideology of our socialist literature and art is a question of principle that determines the character and direction of development of our literature and art. However, for some time in the past, the Marxist theory and Mao Zedong Thought on literature and art were considered "outmoded." They were described as "old conventions" which must be broken down and discarded because they hampered creative thinking. Of course they were not recognized as the guiding ideology of our socialist literature and art. Particularly worth pointing out is that some

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people adopted a very casual attitude toward Comrade Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art."

For example, in his "talks," Comrade Mao Zedong described the question of who is our literature and art for as "a fundamental principle and a question of principle." He also specifically pointed out: "All our literature and art are for the masses of the people and in the first place for the workers, peasants and soldiers." This has long been upheld as the correct orientation of our literature and art. However, as the contention of "art for art's sake," which had been criticized back in the 1930's, regains its popularity, the principle of literature and art serving the people and socialism is negated. Comrade Mao Zedong also said that literary and art workers should integrate themselves with the masses and remold their own outlook. This is the gist of the "talks," and it provides an answer to how literature and art should serve the masses of the people. However, different arguments against this kind of integration have also asserted themselves. Some people maintain that literature and art are a means of "self-expression" and that "artistic creation is the reflex of an artist's subjective self." They simply deny that the life of the people is the "only source" of literature and art. Some people are also opposed to the slogan that writers must "plunge into the thick of life," maintaining that it is "an argument of vulgar sociology and the mechanical theory of reflection" to ask the writers to go among the masses and integrate with them. On the relations of literature and art to politics, we recognize the relative independence of literature and art and agree that it is all right not to repeat the slogan "literature and art are subordinate to politics" under the present circumstances. But, in the final analysis, literature and art cannot be cut off from politics. Nonetheless, the relative independence of literature and art is sometimes given so much stress that it sounds like opposition to politics. These people who preach that "literature and art should be divorced from politics" and that "politicians and artists should not interfere with each other" are actually advocating art for art's sake. These people not only do not recognize proletarian literature and art as a part of the entire proletarian revolutionary cause and make no reference to the fact that literature and art must unite and educate the people but regard the call to pay attention to social effects as a "big stick" and as some kind of flagrant interference. The advocacy of and popularity won by these erroneous viewpoints concerning literature and art have not only brought about new confusion in literary and art thought but have provided a theoretical basis for bourgeois liberalization in literary and art work.

Comrade Mao Zedong's "talks" is another important classic piece after Lenin's "Party Organization and Party Literature" that systematically developed the Marxist theory on literature and art. In this piece of writing, Comrade Mao Zedong applied the basic principles of Marxism and incisively expounded major issues such as the relationship between literature and art and the people and the relationship between literature and art and life in the light of the concrete practices of China's revolutionary literature and art. He also provided the answers to a number of questions which were subjects of contention in the literary and art circles then. It is obviously very wrong to take a reckless or even negative attitude toward such a richly laid out and systematic writing on the Marxist theory on literature and art. Of course, this does not mean that every exposition included in the "talks" is still applicable today. Toward those

viewpoints which can no longer fit in with the present circumstances, it is necessary to make new explanations in the light of the new historical conditions. If some viewpoints are found to be more harmful than useful through the test of practice, they can be discarded. However, this does not mean that we can discard the basic principles put forth in the "talks," still less negate Mao Zedong Thought on literature and art.

Facts show that the call put forth by the party Central Committee to overcome the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization completely conforms with the objective reality in the literary and art circles and on the entire ideological front. Obviously it is both groundless and fundamentally wrong to describe the call to overcome bourgeois liberalization as "an invention of an imaginary enemy" and "Don Quixote battling against the windmill," or to dismiss it as "making a mountain out of a molehill."

The ideological trend of bourgeois liberalization not only goes against the four basic principles but does not tally with the guideline on emancipating the mind put forth by the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee. In order to emancipate the mind, what we must do is mainly break away from the shackles of erroneous leftist ideas over the years, uphold the principle of seeking truth from facts, make our subjective thinking tally with the objective reality, think in terms of dialectical and historical materialism, understand the new circumstances and solve new problems in the light of the characteristics of the new historical period and consciously advance along the socialist path. However, some comrades in the literary and art circles misinterpreted this policy put forth at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee and practiced liberalization in the name of emancipating the mind, thus betraying the four basic principles. The party Central Committee has always been very clear and consistent in its guiding ideology on upholding the four basic principles and opposing the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization. Not long after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, Comrade Deng Xiaoping specifically put forth and incisively expounded the four basic principles at a party meeting to discuss ideological guidelines for theoretical work, urging the whole party and the people of the whole country to unswervingly uphold the four basic principles. As the emancipation of the mind deepened, there emerged erroneous ideological trends toward violating the four basic principles. In order to counter these trends, Comrade Deng Xiaoping delivered a report "On the Current Situation and Tasks" on behalf of the party Central Committee in early 1980. In this report, he reiterated the need to uphold the four basic principles. He also pointed out: "We must resolutely eliminate anarchist trends of thought which the 'gang of four' introduced into the party as well as all brands of bourgeois liberalism which have newly emerged within the party." Early this year, on the basis of a criticism made by Comrade Deng Xiaoping that our party "has not done a positive, resolute and convincing job of publicizing the four basic principles" in its propaganda work, the party Central Committee adopted a decision on the policy of propaganda work. This decision emphasized that "upholding the party's leadership is the core of upholding the four basic principles" and said that we must "criticize and oppose tendencies toward anarchism, individualism and bourgeois liberalization." However, the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization has not been rectified. Now, the party Central Committee is once again making it quite clear that "we must conduct serious and correct criticism and wage a

necessary and appropriate struggle against ideological trends that deviate from the socialist path and from party leadership and favor bourgeois liberalization." This is an important task confronting the ideological front, including the literary and art front.

What is it that the problem of bourgeois liberalization has not been solved in earnest despite so much emphasis given to it by the party Central Committee? As far as the literary and art front is concerned, the chief responsibility lies with weakness and laxity in leadership. However, the incongruity among some comrades in their comprehension of the relationship between the calls to emancipate the mind and to uphold the four basic principles put forth by the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee also has something to do with it. As some comrades see it, emancipating the mind means that they can write what and how they please without following the four basic principles and regardless of the social effects. In short, it means "absolute freedom" without any restriction whatsoever. Its substance is to depart from the socialist path, break away from party leadership and let bourgeois ideas spread unchecked. This is the exact opposite of what we mean by emancipating the mind. After going through the 10 turbulent years, many writers, especially the middle-aged and young ones, might want to sum up past lessons and do some soul-searching and thinking about life in society on their own. This is commendable. However, some comrades were wrong in their stand, orientation and point of departure. They confined themselves within an "inner world" of solitude and cut themselves off from the life and struggle of the people and observed society with feelings of discontent toward the party and the socialist system. By putting the individual in a wrong relationship to the masses of the people and cutting off the ties between the fate of the individual on the one hand and the destiny of the motherland and the future of the nation on the other, they cannot but fall into the trap of bourgeois liberalization. Emancipating the mind is simply out of the question. No doubt we must continue to eliminate the influence of leftist ideas that hamper the emancipation of the mind. However, we must also pay particular attention to the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization, which will also hamper the emancipation of the mind, and resolutely overcome such a tendency. We must persist in waging a struggle between the two lines in literary and art work.

"Is it not true that the proletariat also advocates freedom of creation?" Some comrades used this as a pretext and quoted some of Lenin's remarks to justify themselves and defend bourgeois liberalization. None of these arguments are tenable. True, in his important writing entitled "Party Organization and Party Literature," Lenin did say that "literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or leveling, to the rule of the majority over the minority," that "in this field greater scope must be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content." However, Lenin only said this to supplement his statement that "literature must become part of the common cause of the proletariat"--a principle of literature based on the party spirit. Moreover, he immediately pointed out: "All this simply shows that the literary side of the proletarian party cause cannot be mechanically identified with its other sides. This, however, does not in the least refute the proposition, alien and strange to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois democracy, that literature must by all means and necessarily become an element of social-democratic party work, inseparably bound up with the other elements." It is very clear that the

particular character of literature mentioned by Lenin presupposes injection of the principle of literature based on party spirit and affirmation of the literary cause as a component of the entire party cause. In the same piece, Lenin exposed the hypocrisy about "absolute freedom" of literary creation clamored by the bourgeoisie, pointing out that only proletarian literature, which is free of bourgeois "greed" and "careerism" and which serves "the millions and tens of millions of working people," is truly free literature. In this piece of writing by Lenin, no one can find any theoretical basis for equating the freedom of creation with bourgeois liberalization and for defending bourgeois liberalization.

Referring to the party's leadership over literary and art work in his "congratulatory message" to the fourth national congress of writers and artists, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said in clear-cut terms: "Literature and art is a kind of complicated mental labor. It requires that the artists bring their creative spirit into play. The question of what to write and how to write can only be solved gradually by the artists themselves through practice. There should be no flagrant interference in this regard." Some comrades quoted these words by Comrade Deng Xiaoping to justify the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization, which is aimed at breaking away from party leadership. Actually, what Deng Xiaoping was saying here is a viewpoint put forth under the premise that the party must properly exercise leadership over literary and art work. This viewpoint stresses that the party must lead literary and art work in accordance with the characteristics and law of development of art. There is not the slightest trace of "absolute freedom" which is aimed at breaking away from party leadership in what Comrade Deng Xiaoping said. However, we should not forget that what Comrade Deng Xiaoping put forth in his "congratulatory message" is the comprehensive literary and art policy of the party. It maintains that literature and art must keep to the orientation of serving the people and socialism. Literary and art work must shoulder the task of satisfying the people's spiritual needs, fostering the new communist man and raising the ideological and moral standards of the whole society. Literary and art workers must make great efforts to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and enhance their ability to understand and analyze life and see through the appearance to get at the essence. The literary and art workers must regard the people as their mothers, go into the very midst of the people and maintain flesh and blood ties with them. Literary and art creation must truthfully reflect life in society, show the fine qualities of the people, sing in praise of the struggles waged and the victories won by the people in the course of revolution and construction, and at the same time resist, denounce and oppose various erroneous trends in conjunction with work in the other ideological fields. It is necessary to uphold the policies of letting a hundred flowers blossom, weeding through the old to bring forth the new, making the past serve the present and foreign things serve China. Literary and art works must pay attention to social effects. It is necessary to unfold literary and art criticism to strengthen and improve the party's leadership over literary and art work, and so on. All these aspects are interrelated and inseparable. They show that the party's literary and art policy has the unified character of being comprehensive, rational and scientific. Any attempt to remove a certain aspect from the integrated whole and to emphasize one aspect to the neglect or even negation of the other aspects would turn them into their opposites--aspects that are one-sided, contrary to reason and unscientific.

Compared with the tremendous achievements made in literary and art work in recent years, the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization which now exists in the literary and art circles is just something of secondary importance. However, even though it is only of secondary importance, we should not underestimate its seriousness and treat it lightly. Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "Literary and art work has a profound impact on the ideological trends of the people, especially the young ones, and on stability and unity in society." Literature and art have a strong artistic appeal. They can exert an imperceptible influence on people, mold their temperament and foster noble sentiments. If our literature and art do not pay attention to overcoming the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization, they not only will not be able to use proletarian ideas to educate the people, especially the young ones, to resist the influence of nonproletarian ideas, but will become a hotbed that breeds and propagates all kinds of erroneous trends of thought. This will not only hamper the party's and the people's great cause of socialist modernization but will also hamper the solemn cause of socialist literature and art which has the fostering of the new communist man as its goal. The latter is an inalienable part of the former. Therefore, all serious-minded writers and artists who have a sense of responsibility should identify themselves with the party and the people, consciously resist the ideological influence of bourgeois liberalization, create more and better works through their own artistic practice in order to inspire and encourage the people, particularly to educate the great numbers of youths, to work with one heart and one mind, make China strong and prosperous and contribute toward building a powerful and modern socialist country with a high degree of democracy and civilization.

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WHY IS THE 3D PLENARY SESSION OF THE 11TH CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND NOT THE DOWNFALL OF THE 'GANG OF FOUR,' TAKEN AS A GREAT TURNING POINT IN HISTORY?

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 39-41

[Article by Wang Hongmo [3769 3163 2875] in "Questions and Answers" column]

[Text] The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" regards the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee highly and says that it was "a crucial turning point of far-reaching significance in the history of our party since the birth of the PRC." Why is the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, and not the downfall of the "gang of four," taken as a great turning point in history? This is because in the first 2 years after the downfall of the "gang of four," the wrong theories, policies and slogans of the "Great Cultural Revolution," instead of being corrected, were reaffirmed and continued, and the "leftist" errors in our party's guiding ideology continued in some important issues and various aspects of our work.

Undoubtedly, the victory achieved in smashing the counterrevolutionary clique of the "gang of four" has rid the body of our party of a malignant tumor and put an end to the decade-long disaster of the "Great Cultural Revolution." However, the victorious convention of the significant 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee not only put an end to the 2 years of unsteady advance after smashing the "gang of four," but also, and more importantly, began to conscientiously and in an all-round way correct the "leftist" errors of the "Great Cultural Revolution" and before, and fundamentally changed the long-standing erroneous "leftist" orientation of our party's guiding ideology. This was really a historical change which symbolized that our party had reestablished the Marxist ideological, political and organizational line.

This plenary session restored and developed the party's fine tradition, evolved since its seventh national congress, and the correct theories, line and policies formulated at the eighth national congress. It resolutely criticized the erroneous "two-whatever's" policy and affirmed the need to grasp Mao Zedong Thought comprehensively and accurately as a scientific system. It evaluated the forum on the criterion of truth highly and decided on the guiding principle of emancipating the mind, using our brains, seeking truth from facts and uniting as one in looking forward to the future. It firmly discarded the slogan "take class struggle as the key link," which had become unsuitable in a socialist society, and made the strategic decision to shift the focus of work to socialist

modernization. It also made a series of important decisions on the development of the national economy. These fundamental changes were of far-reaching significance in strengthening the people's faith in our party, which had been injured by the counterrevolutionary Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques, and in building our country into a modern socialist country.

The problem of shifting the focus of our party's work to socialist modernization was a problem of strategic importance, one which had not been properly solved for nearly 20 years. Originally, since the party's eighth national congress, the focus of the party's work had been gradually shifted to socialist economic construction and we had scored successive achievements in this respect. However, the problem of class struggle was emphasized later and political movements came one after another. As a result, the focus of work was not finally shifted to vigorously developing the national economy. Why had the focus of work not been shifted for such a long time, including the 2 years before the opening of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee? Fundamentally, the reason for this is inseparable from Comrade Mao Zedong's erroneous theories, viewpoints and policies characterized by "taking class struggle as the key link," which was shaped on the basis of his erroneous evaluation and assessment of the class situation in Chinese society and his continuing, since the antirightist struggle in 1957, to take that which did not belong to class struggle as a class struggle. Not until the third plenary session did we realistically and scientifically reevaluate and reassess the class situation and social contradictions in China's society. As we are Marxists, when we formulate policies and principles or set tasks for a certain period, we must do so on the basis of analyzing the situation of social classes and social contradictions. And only when this analysis is in keeping with the actual situation can we make correct decisions on setting tasks and formulating policies and principles. It was the party's third plenary session that criticized and negated Comrade Mao Zedong's erroneous evaluation and assessment in his later years, and restored the correct evaluation and assessment of the party's eighth national congress, thus opening up a path for the shifting of the focus of our party's work. The third plenary session reflected the will of the whole party and the people of all nationalities and solved the problem of basic theories, line and policies.

Over the past 60 years since the founding of our party, we have experienced several historical turning points. Some were the turnabouts from failure to victory and some were from victory to still greater victory. But only two of them can be called great historical turning points with far-reaching significance. They are the Zunyi meeting held during the period of the democratic revolution and the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee. The Zunyi meeting, held in January 1935, began to correct the "leftist" errors which lasted for 4 years from January 1931 to January 1935, and to establish the correct line of Marxism organizationally and militarily. After the Wuyao Bao meeting we realized the correct change of the political line, thus pushing the war of resistance against Japan into a new historical stage. During the rectification movement in 1942, the problems of the ideological line were further solved. This was the continuation and development of the Zunyi meeting, the great turning point. Because of this great turnabout, our party was able to achieve victory in the war of resistance against Japan and victory in the war of liberation, and finally to seize state power.

It is quite reasonable for the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee held in December 1978 to be likened to "the Zunyi meeting in the socialist period." These two meetings were alike in many aspects, yet in certain conditions and in a sense, the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee was confronted with a more complicated situation and more resistance than the Zunyi meeting. During the more than 20 years before this plenary session, our party achieved many successes, but also made serious mistakes. During the decade-long "Great Cultural Revolution," in particular, due to the "leftist" errors in the guiding ideology committed by Comrade Mao Zedong and the sabotage of the counter-revolutionary Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques and resultant turmoil, the party, the state and the people were plunged into great misfortune. The personality cult, which was advocated by the counterrevolutionary Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques, had a profound influence within our party and among the masses of people. It has not been easy for us to eliminate this influence, to cast off the yoke of the "two-whatever's" policy, and to correct the errors of the "Great Cultural Revolution," which affected the whole situation. With the thoroughgoing spirit of materialism and in conformity with the development of history, the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee accomplished this significant historical mission. It renewed the mental outlook of the broad masses of party members, cadres and people, and brushed aside a large ideological obstacle on the road to building a powerful modern socialist country with a high degree of democracy and civilization. The great role it played in socialist construction can already be seen in the construction work for the four modernizations and other work over the past 2 years and will continue to be seen increasingly clearly in future development.

As to the victory achieved in smashing the "gang of four," the resolution also fully affirms its historical contribution. It says that this victory "saved the party and the revolution from disaster and enabled our country to enter a new historical period of development." However, owing to the limitations of the historical conditions and the level of understanding, the smashing of the "gang of four" only solved the problem between ourselves and the enemy. It did not point out and correct the errors of the "Great Cultural Revolution" which affected the overall situation. This is why in the 2 years after the downfall of the "gang of four," the erroneous theories and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution" continued to a great extent to hinder our socialist cause from advancing victoriously. As was pointed out by the resolution, this was "of course, partly due to the fact that the political and ideological confusion created in the decade-long 'Great Cultural Revolution' could not be eliminated overnight, but it was also due to the 'leftist' errors in the guiding ideology that Comrade Hua Guofeng continued to commit in his capacity as chairman of the CCP Central Committee." Since the smashing of the "gang of four" only created favorable conditions for the following great turnabout, it did not in itself constitute a great historical turning point. If we took the smashing of the "gang of four" as the great turning point in history, it would mean the affirmation of the "leftist" theories and policies in the first 2 years after the downfall of the "gang of four," which continued in many aspects the erroneous theories and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution," and the affirmation of the long-standing "leftist" errors. Thus, we would be unable to explain why our party had advanced unsteadily with difficult steps in those 2 years.

Our experience in the recent past also shows that without the fundamental correction of the "leftist" theories and policies by the third plenary session, the benefit gained in smashing the "gang of four" cannot be realized. This is because if these "leftist" theories and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution," which were one of the most important conditions supporting the activities of the "gang of four" and their ilk, remain uncorrected, the remnants of the "gang of four" will make use of them to stir up new trouble. Do we not see that some of these remnants have declared that they will "see the outcome of the whole affair in another 10 years"? Obviously, the danger does exist. During the "Great Cultural Revolution," after smashing the counterrevolutionary Lin Biao clique, our party did not check and correct the "leftist" theories and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution," and they were then exploited by the "gang of four" to continue making trouble. This was a historical lesson of practical significance. In this respect, the third plenary session played the key role in defending the benefit gained in smashing the "gang of four" and in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

From the above analysis, we can see that it is a realistic and scientific decision of the resolution to take the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee and not the downfall of the "gang of four" as a great turning point in history.

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HOW SHOULD WE CORRECTLY VIEW SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION AFTER THE BASIC COMPLETION OF SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION?

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 41-43

[Article by Xue Mu [5641 3664]]

[Text] The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" pointed out: "'Thinking that capitalist forces and bourgeois elements will at all times be emerging in large numbers even after the basic completion of socialist transformation' is a 'misunderstanding and dogmatization' of Lenin's thesis." If we want to correctly understand this thesis, we must understand the historical conditions in Russia when Lenin put forward this thesis and the historical conditions after socialist transformation in China.

Lenin put forward this thesis in 1920 in his article "'Left Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder." At that time, it was not yet 3 years since the proletariat had seized political power. In agriculture, the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production was not underway. Although there were collective economic organizations such as "agricultural communes" and "agricultural work groups," they were few in number. The small-scale peasant economy, which was like a boundless ocean, occupied a dominant position in the national economy and it still maintained its relations with the remnant capitalist economy. Under such circumstances, the peasants inevitably divided into diametrically opposed groups. It was just as Lenin had said, "As laborers, the peasants prefer socialism," "as the sellers of grain, they prefer the bourgeoisie and free trade." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 29, pp 351-352) "The peasant economy is still within the range of the production of small commodities. This is a very broad and solid capitalist foundation on which capitalism may be retained and restored." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 30, p 89)

Between April and May 1920, Soviet Russia was at war and gunpowder smoke spread all over the country. As early as the first half of 1918, the imperialists collaborated with Russia's landlord bourgeoisie in launching armed attacks against Soviet political power in a futile attempt to strangle it in the cradle. The long-drawn-out war seriously damaged Russia's economy and caused an extreme shortage of grain and other goods. Sometimes the workers in cities could only get 1/8 of a pound of bread. Sometimes they could not have any bread at all for a whole day. Many workers collapsed from starvation beside their machines. In order to guarantee the supply of grain to the front and to the urban citizens, the

Soviet government carried out wartime communist policies, which included the system of collecting surplus grain and the prohibition of private trading in grain. After the October Revolution, the broad masses of the laboring peasants obtained land and their livelihood improved. Therefore, they followed the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and were willing to turn over their surplus grain to the state in support and defense of the revolutionary war waged by Soviet political power. For instance, between 1918 and 1919, the peasants turned over and sold 40 million poods of grain to the state. But the rich peasants and some well-to-do peasants undermined the system of collecting surplus grain. They sold their grain on the black market at a price 10 times higher than that of the state and carried out speculation and profiteering in an attempt to make a fortune and become richer. The grain sold on the black market by speculators was equal to the total quantity of grain purchased from the peasants by the state. Lenin said: "A peasant has several hundred poods of grain in his house. He is not willing to lend his grain to the state for providing relief to the starving workers but wants to use it for speculation instead. What does this mean? Is it not the bourgeoisie? Is this not where the bourgeoisie comes from?" ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 30, p 206) Lenin held that it was necessary to "differentiate the peasants who till the land from the peasants who do business and the peasants who engage in labor from the peasants who carry out speculation." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 30, p 93) The peasants who tilled the land and who engaged in labor were willing to turn over their surplus grain to the state. They "have proved to be the comrades, reliable allies and blood brothers of the socialist workers," while "the peasants who carry out speculation and do business" were "unscrupulous merchants," "the allies of the capitalists" and "the enemies of the workers" and "exploiters." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 30, p 94) Those whom Lenin referred to as "capitalist forces and bourgeois elements spontaneously emerging in large numbers every day and every hour from small-scale production" were peasants who did business and carried out speculation. They were mainly rich peasants. At that time, in Russia's countryside, the Bolshevik Party led the poor peasants in their fierce struggle against the rich peasants.

The social and historical conditions after the basic completion of socialist transformation in China were fundamentally different from those in Russia. After the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production, joint state-private ownership was realized in capitalist industry and commerce, collectivization was basically realized in the individual economy, and the economy of socialist public ownership occupied an absolute and dominant position in the national economy. By the end of 1957, the number of peasant households that had joined the agricultural producers' cooperatives accounted for 98 percent of the total number of peasant households in the country. The number of individual handicraftsmen who joined the handicraft producers' cooperatives was as high as 90 percent. The great majority of small merchants and peddlers also realized collectivization. The broad masses of peasants and other individual laborers had already become socialist collective laborers embarked on the broad road of socialism. In the socialist collective economy, the means of production is commonly owned by its collective members, the products are allocated according to the principle of to each according to his work and the economic condition that can bring about division into two diametrically opposed groups has been abolished. The socialist collective economy is the economic foundation in China's rural areas. It is the material guarantee for the members of the collective economy

to become well-off together as well as the best form for promoting the productive forces and going into more perfect and more advanced public ownership when the productive forces greatly develop in the future. Therefore, we must never regard the socialist collective laborers as individual small-scale producers. No capitalist forces of bourgeois elements will emerge in large numbers daily and hourly among the collective peasants. It is true that some peasants still have backward ideas and habits. For instance, in the relationship between the interests of the state, the collective and the individual, they sometimes only seek personal gain. They fleece the state at the expense of state and collective interests whenever an opportunity presents itself. This requires long-term ideological education. It is obviously ridiculous to think that their backward ideology will inevitably engender capitalist forces and bourgeois elements.

The commune members' private land and household sideline production have some characteristics of the individual economy, but they are within the range of small-scale production. However, they are different from small-scale production before the socialist transformation. They supplement the collective economy. The commune members' private land is small in area. They only have the right to use but not to own land. They are not allowed to buy or sell land; neither are they allowed to rent it. Household sideline production is carried out with assistance from the collective economy. Exploitation through the hiring of labor is prohibited. It is reasonable and legal for commune members to operate on their private land, obtain a comparatively high income from sideline production and become comparatively well-off. Private land and household sideline production will not engender capitalist forces and bourgeois elements.

The small-scale individual economy remaining after socialist transformation is different from the individual economy before socialist transformation. Before socialist transformation, the individual economy not only occupied a large proportion of the national economy but also maintained traditional relations with capitalist industry and commerce in production, supply and marketing. This would inevitably bring about a division into two diametrically opposed groups. Since the socialist transformation of the means of production, the proportion of the individual economy in the national economy has become so small that it does not have any connection with capitalist industry and commerce. Small-scale production has never been an independent socioeconomic form that occupied a dominant position. On the contrary, it is controlled by the economic form that occupies a dominant position. Marx said: "In all social forms, there must be a certain production that controls all other production positions and influences."

("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 2, p 109) Under the condition that the economy of socialist public ownership occupies an absolutely dominant position, the individual economy is controlled by the economy of socialist public ownership. It plays an active role under the guidance of the socialist economy and has become a supplement to the economy of socialist public ownership. In addition, the individual economy has to rely on the socialist economy for the supply of raw materials, credit funds and marketing of products. There are restrictions on the scope of management. Large-scale hiring of labor is not allowed. Generally speaking, it is impossible for the peasants to become capitalists under these conditions. Of course, individual small-scale producers are still the private owners of the means of production. They carry out their production under decentralized management, and some problems will probably arise

from this. But so long as we strengthen our ideological education and carry out appropriate economic measures and administrative management, it is quite possible to guide them in such a way that they will advance healthily. Capitalism will not be allowed to spread unchecked, and capitalist forces and bourgeois elements will not be able to emerge in large numbers, regularly, daily and hourly.

The basic principle of Marxism is of universal guiding significance. But individual conclusions drawn according to specific conditions by proletarian revolutionary teachers have the truthfulness of the relevant specific conditions. If their individual theses are applied at random without differentiating time, place and condition, and if the range of application is expanded, then this is a misunderstanding of these theses and we will inevitably commit the mistake of dogmatism. It is obviously a misunderstanding and dogmatization of Lenin's thesis to apply indiscriminately the conclusions drawn by Lenin before the socialist transformation of small-scale production in Russia to the condition after the socialist transformation in China.

This misunderstanding and dogmatization resulted in a series of leftist economic policies in the cities and a series of policies on class struggle in the cities and the countryside. In the economic field, we were afraid that the peasants would divide into two diametrically opposed groups, and we were afraid that some of the peasants would stop taking the socialist road after becoming well-off. Therefore, we were overanxious to carry out the transformation of the ownership system; we carried out absolute egalitarianism in allocation; we considered the commune members' private land, household sideline production and individual economy "capitalist tails" and cut them back again and again. In addition, through class struggle we forced the peasants to implement leftist economic policies. The cadres and masses who did not agree with the leftist economic policies were criticized as capitalists and revisionists. Class struggle could no longer be kept within bounds. This caused great losses to the socialist cause.

A deep understanding of the "resolution" not only will make us understand the important reasons for the leftist mistakes we committed in the past, know how to distinguish right from wrong theoretically, ideologically and politically, and correctly understand the historical experience of the party, but also is of great immediate significance.

First, a deep understanding of the "resolution" is beneficial to further eliminating the leftist influence. Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, our party has fundamentally corrected the leftist guiding thinking. But because the leftist mistakes lasted a long time and had wide and deep effects, the leftist influence in some comrades' minds has not been eliminated. For instance, on hearing that some laborers have become well-off, some comrades feel uneasy, fearing a division into two diametrically opposed groups. They are terrified at the sight of the preliminary rehabilitation and development of the individual economy in the cities and countryside. They always link today's individual economy with capitalism and dare not assist the individual economy. Some even discriminate against the individual economy by every possible means until it breaks down. Other comrades still maintain that the various forms of production responsibility system in agriculture are manifestations of "rightist deviation" and "falling back." The study of the conclusions drawn on this

question by the "resolution" is beneficial to eliminating the influence of the leftist mistakes so that we can implement in a better way the party's line, principles and policies laid down since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee.

Second, a deep understanding of the "resolution" is beneficial to straightening out our ideological line. The ideological root cause of the misunderstanding and dogmatization of Lenin's thesis is subjectivism. On the one hand, no objective, systematic and meticulous investigation and studies of the political and economic situation after China's socialist transformation have been carried out so as to be able to draw correct conclusions. On the other hand, Lenin's thesis on small-scale production, which was completely inapplicable to China, was applied to China's condition without differentiating time, place and condition--hence the deviation from the party's ideological line of seeking truth from facts, of starting from practice in everything and of combining theory with practice. In the history of our party, the mistake of dogmatism was committed several times, and it inflicted great losses on our party every time it occurred. When we study the conclusions on this question drawn by the "resolution," we must learn a lesson from this bitter experience, study hard Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, truly grasp the world outlook and methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, overcome subjectivism in our method of thinking and method of work, and conscientiously adhere to the party's Marxist ideological line. This is of vital importance to our four modernizations.

CSO: 4004/9

SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY DEFENDS THE OLD CZARS' AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION--SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CZARIST RUSSIA'S EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL ASIA

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 pp 44-48, 30

[Article by Lu Wei [4151 5517] and Yang Jianxin [2799 1676 2450]]

[Text] In recent years Soviet historians, acting at the direction of the Soviet authorities, have published a series of articles and books. (These articles and books are too numerous to be all listed; the most important works are as follows: "On the History of the Formation of the Sino-Soviet Border" by Beskrovniy and others, carried in issue No 6 of the Russian journal INTERNATIONAL LIFE in 1972; "Comments on the History of Minority Groups in the Pamirs" by Iskandarov, carried in issue No 1 of FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS in 1973; and "The Qing Empire's Invasion of Central Asia and Russian Policy in the Second Half of the 18th Century," "Several Questions Concerning Han Chauvinism and Central Asian Minorities During the 18th and 19th Centuries," and "Several Questions Concerning the History of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the Distortion of These Questions in PRC Journals" by Gullevich, carried in the journal SOVIET HISTORY respectively in issue No 2 in 1973, issue No 9 in 1974 and issue No 2 in 1979.) These materials were written to defend czarist Russia's criminal annexation of central Asia (including what was China's northwestern border at that time). Moreover, they were used to promote anti-Chinese propaganda. Although they raised a wide variety of seemingly different arguments, they contained no more than three main themes throughout: 1) Czarist Russia's aggression and expansion was in order to "prevent" invasion by other nations; 2) the nations and peoples annexed by czarist Russia were all "incorporated on a voluntary basis"; and 3) the annexation of these countries and peoples promoted the development of the region. In short, czarist Russia's aggression and expansion was entirely justified; not only should it not be criticized but it should be actually praised. The reason that Soviet historians go to such extremes to defend czarist Russia's aggression and expansion obviously is not that they hope to offer comfort to the ghosts of the old czars but rather that they hope to meet the needs of the current Soviet leadership which is pursuing a policy of hegemonism; they are "using the contemptible acts of the past to defend the contemptible acts of the present." ("Complete Works of Marx and Engels," "Introduction to 'Critique of Hegel's Legal Philosophy,'" Vol 1, p 454) Therefore, exposure and refutation of the various fallacies the Soviet historians have used to defend czarist Russia's expansionist policy will help both to restore the true face of history and to alert us to the true nature of the Soviet Union's current hegemonistic foreign policy.

"Preventive" Invasion or Expansionist Invasion?

Everyone is quite clear about the fact that czarist Russia was a great empire which was built by continuously expanding its territory. However, Soviet historians have tried in every possible way to whitewash the masses of relevant historical facts and have even gone so far as to concoct a countercharge, saying that czarist Russia's criminal annexation of central Asia and China's north-western border region was intended only to "prevent" invasion. Gullevich, for example, in his various articles has said that czarist Russia's expansion into the upper reaches of the Ertix River, the Altai region, and Kazakh grasslands was in order to resist the "invasion and harassment" of the Dzungar people and to "prevent a possible attack by the Qing Empire." It was also supposed to be a precautionary measure to "block Chinese expansion beyond the border of Dzungar, eastern Turkistan and western Mongolia." (Gullevich: "The Qing Empire's Invasion of Central Asia and Russian Policy in the Second Half of the 18th Century") But, Beskrovniy and others insist that czarist Russia annexed the three khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Khokand merely to contain the northward extension of British power. (Beskrovniy and others: "On the History of the Formation of the Sino-Soviet Border") Such views are clearly meant to defend czarist Russia's aggression and expansion.

Hegemonistic control of the world was the policy of every czarist ruler, and the expansion of territory has always been the key to such control. From the reign of Ivan IV onward czarist Russia continuously expanded, particularly in the eastern region where its seizure of territory had spread to beyond the Volga River and over the Ural Mountains and included the annexation of Siberia, whereupon it turned the spearhead of its aggression directly toward the northwestern border of China and other central Asia regions. Naturally, the people and countries that suffered invasion could not be expected to subserviently allow themselves to be made slaves. For the local people opposition to Russian aggression by any possible means was, of course, entirely justified. However, in the eyes of Soviet historians such resistance was an unforgivable outrage as it constituted an aggressive threat to czarist Russia; Russian aggression, on the other hand, is seen as the "just" prevention of invasion.

We can take the area around the upper reaches of the Ertix River as an example. This area was originally the territory of the Chinese Dzungars but after czarist Russia had seized the lower reaches of the river at the end of the 16th century, the czar sent the Kazakhs upstream toward the south, often intruding into Dzungar territory. Particularly during the reign of Peter I, the czarist government saw the southward route along the Ertix River as a shortcut for the invasion of China. ((Jie-lian-ji-ye-fu) [2212 6647 1323 5102 1133]: "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 1, p 19, published in 1906 in St Petersburg) At the beginning of the 18th century when it was learned that the Chinese area of Yarkant had gold mines, Peter I in 1714 dispatched an "investigatory unit" led by a lieutenant colonel to the area to "investigate." This "investigatory unit" was composed of more than 2,900 fully armed soldiers (it was later increased by another 1,000 men). They followed the Ertix River upstream toward the south, building fortifications as they went in the hope of annexing the whole western section of China's Xinjiang region at one fell swoop. Owing to the steadfast resistance of the Dzungars, this plan remained unfulfilled. In the latter half of the 19th century,

however, czarist Russia took advantage of the fact that China was being dismembered by the great powers and was powerless to protect its western borders, and eventually succeeded in annexing the upper reaches of the Ertix River as well as several other areas to the northeast.

The annexation of the Kazakh grasslands followed a similar pattern. As early as the 17th century this region was already seen as "the hinge or door which connects Russia to Asia." (Schuler: "Turkestan," Vol 2, p 403, published in 1876 in London) At the beginning of the 18th century the czar "dispatched troops to the banks of the Ural and Ertix Rivers in order to bring the area's people under control." ((Jie-lian-ji-ye-fu): "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 1, p 19) During the 1830's the Kazakh lesser tents were forced to "acknowledge allegiance" to czarist Russia. Russia's influence then extended into the Kazakh medium tents. Finally, in the 1840's Russia annexed the Kazakh greater tents. Historical facts prove that no time before or after this series of annexations did a single nation in this region ever invade Russia or even pose any threat to Russia. In fact, it was czarist Russia which took advantage of the Qing government's weakness and shamelessly expanded into the Kazakh grasslands and the western section of China's Xinjiang region. The situation was just as one of the architects of Russia's expansionist policy described it, from the end of the 19th century the "weakness and powerlessness" of the Qing government "greatly facilitated our efforts to penetrate beyond the far bank of the Ili River and launch an attack into central Asia." (Babakov: "Recollections of My Stay in Siberia," p 157, published in St Petersburg in 1912)

While the contradictions and competition between Russia and England for Khiva and the other two khanates of central Asia were certainly very intense, it was Russia which was the most aggressive party from beginning to end. As far as Russia was concerned the three khanates of central Asia were not only extremely alluring quarry in their own right but were also an important bridge with India.

As early as 1717, Peter I sent troops to conquer Khiva, believing that "forcing Khiva and Bokhara to acknowledge Russian rule was a necessary precondition for our control of the central Asian grasslands." ("Asian Russians," p 126, edited by the immigration section of the Russian Land and Construction Bureau, published in 1914) Furthermore, England at this time had not yet set foot in central Asia. At the beginning of the 19th century, czar Paul I ordered Russian troops to proceed from Orenberg to Astrakhan and then cross the Caspian Sea to Ashkhabad, and then directly travel down into India through Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. ("Modern Soviet History," p 126, edited by A. M. Pankratova and translated by Sheng Wei, published in 1954 by China Bookstore) This would have put the three central Asian khanates, Afghanistan and India all directly under the rule of czarist Russia. Since Paul I died less than 2 months after issuing this order, the expeditionary force had no choice but to turn back half way, while his successors strove desperately to accomplish this mission. In the middle of the 19th century Russia once more directed its attention toward central Asia, and during the 1860's and 1870's managed to conquer the three central Asia khanates and finally "established an excellent base from which China and the English dependency of east India could be attacked," and since Russia had already annexed Khokand, it was very easy for further "Russian expansion into the Pamir region." ((Jie-lian-ji-ye-fu): "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 2, p 426) Even the Soviet historian

Iskandarov cannot but admit that, "the incorporation of central Asia into Russia and the movement of Russian troops toward the Pamirs caused considerable consternation among members of the British ruling class. In the hope of stopping further Russian movement in the direction of the British colony of India, English troops were quickly moved to forward positions into Hindu Kush." (Iskandarov: "Comments on the History of Minority Groups in the Pamirs") Since this was the case, how can one continue to say that czarist Russia's annexation of the three central Asia khanates was meant only as means of preventing England from moving further north? As Engels pointed out, it was in order to meet its own economic needs that Russia "continued to invade the Balkan Peninsula and Asia. The final aim of its aggression in the Balkans was the conquest of Constantinople, while the invasion of Asia was motivated by the desire to conquer the British colony of India." ("Complete Works of Marx and Engels," "German Socialism," Vol 22, p 300)

Soviet historians have also distorted the truth about the seizure of the Chinese Pamir region by czarist Russia, saying that since "in the late 1880's the Qing authorities at the instigation of the British intended to unilaterally occupy the eastern Pamirs," (Beskrovnyi: "On the History of the Formation of the Sino-Soviet Border"), czarist Russia was forced to invade the central Pamirs in order to prevent both British expansion and Chinese aggression.

Historically, the Pamirs have always been Chinese territory; from the western Han period onward successive Chinese governments established administrative offices and military garrisons in the area and had managed to control the region successfully. From the middle of the 19th century both Britain and Russia began to penetrate into this region from the south and north respectively. In 1884, czarist Russia coerced China's Qing government into signing "the Sino-Soviet treaty of continuously surveying the boundary at Kashgar," and annexed the northwestern section of China's Pamirs. During the 1880's and 1890's England seized (Kan-ju-ti) [0522 1565 2251] and began to intensify its operations in the southwestern region of the Pamirs. Under such conditions of increasingly fierce rivalry between Britain and Russia over the control of the Pamirs, the Qing government began to strengthen defense measures in the region. In 1892 Russia, flaunting the banner of "stopping the premeditated occupation of Russian territory by neighboring countries," ((Jie-lian-ji-ye-fu): "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 3, p 405) openly violated the clauses of the above-mentioned treaty and dispatched troops into the Pamirs, seizing over 20,000 square meters of Chinese territory west of the (Sa-lei-kuo-le) [5646 7191 7059 0519] range. Soviet historians, however, mock historical facts, saying that these acts of open aggression were designed merely to guard against Chinese aggression. Insofar as there existed acute contradictions between the two imperial powers of Britain and Russia, both countries must be seen as aggressors, especially as such contradictions were based on mutual conflict over the seizure of colonies and dependencies and the plundering of the wealth of seized territories. However, Soviet historians insist on seeing this aggression in terms of "defense," and this clearly shows that they are acting at the direction of the Soviet authorities who are seeking every way possible to defend the Soviet Union's illegal occupation of the Chinese Pamir region, regardless of whether or not this involves the inversion of right and wrong or the distortion of history.

"Voluntary Incorporation" or Annexation by Force?

According to the arguments in several Soviet historical works it was not czarist Russia that annexed central Asia but rather that the people of the area "hoped to become Russian citizens" (Gullevich: "The Qing Empire's Invasion of Central Asia and Russian Policy in the Second Half of the 18th Century"), and "sought Russian protection and demanded that they be accepted as Russian subjects." ((Pu-luo-huo-luo-fu) [2528 5012 7207 1133]: "On the Sino-Soviet Border Question," p 139, published by the Moscow INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS in 1975) In a word, it was because the people of central Asia sought the benevolence and mercy of czarist Russia that the whole region was smoothly incorporated into Russia.

What are the actual facts?

Before the middle of the 19th century czarist Russia's annexation of the Kazakh grasslands and China's northwestern border was accomplished through gradual military nibbling. As one of the old czars' followers, who took part in the slaughter of central Asian people admitted, "Our military border advances forward like a chain, and we have already seized a large section of the grasslands." He also proclaimed that "military garrisons and troops are the best tools for taming the masses." ((Jie-lian-ji-ye-fu): "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 1, p 52) After the middle of the 19th century, however, the construction of garrisons and gradual military nibbling could no longer satisfy czarist Russia's expansionist desires and they began open warfare, using brutal military force to conquer the three khanates of Khiva, Khokand and Bokhara and the Turkistan region. Cities and towns through which the Russian army passed were razed to the ground while numerous villages were also reduced to rubble. "The troops plundered and pillages as they advanced," "destroying the grain stocks and unharvested crops of any village and town they entered." (Ibid., Vol 3, p 109) The burning, killing and pillaging carried on by the Russian army caused the people of central Asia an unprecedented amount of suffering.

In order to defend the criminal aggression of czarist Russia, some Soviet historians cite the treaties concluded between Russia and high-ranking leaders in central Asia as "legal proof" of central Asia's "voluntary incorporation" into Russia. In actual fact, this only highlights the cunning and perfidy of the aggressors. These "treaty agreements," exalted by believers of the "voluntary incorporation" argument, are nothing more than a farce and fraud played out by the Russian aggressors who managed to buy off few high-ranking leaders in the region. Furthermore, the agreements were reached under and supported by the military threat posed by the so-called "expeditionary force." Here we shall only discuss the "merging" of Kazakh lesser tent with Russia. When Peter I first sent troops into Kazakhstan he pointed out to his subordinates that, "If this khanate is unwilling to come under the direct jurisdiction of Russia, a treaty which enjoins the Russian empire to undertake protection of the area will do. The expenses involved may be high, perhaps even as high as a million, however, this is not to concern you." (Soviet magazine RED RECORDS, Vol 78, p 188, published in 1936) After this, the czarist followers, ignoring the great expense involved, managed to buy off Abahai [second Manchu emperor]. Not long after the khan had sworn "loyalty" to the czar, however, he and the Russian representative, Colonel (Jie-fo-ke-lie-fu) [2212 1715 0344 0441 1133], were both driven out of the

khanate by the local people. The khan who had been bought off by the Russians was later killed by his own people. At the same time, however, czarist Russia also organized an "expeditionary force" headed by Ji-li-luo-fu [1015 6849 3157 1133] which had as its mission the "supervision" of the local Kazakhs and Bashkirs. It was also instructed to try to use every possible means of "playing one ethnic group off against the other." This "expeditionary force" was extremely large; the second echelon alone comprised five cavalry companies. ((Jie-lian-jie-fu): "The History of the Conquest of Central Asia," Vol 1, pp 61, 48) The so-called "merging" of Kazakh lesser tent with Russia was the result of this kind of military threat and political trickery. Because this was the case, when the (Qi-ke-lin) [1142 0344 2651] people of Kazakhstan managed to repulse the Russians from Kara-kam it was openly declared that, Abahai is the only Russian subject in the area. He has sent his sons to Russia and often receives rewards. None of us, however, are Russian subjects. (Ib'1., p 53)

The most convincing and thorough refutation of the lies about "voluntary incorporation" is, of course, the continuous struggle of the central Asian people against the Russian aggressors. Even in the 18th century anti-Russian "rebellions" and "disturbances" frequently broke out on the Kazakh grasslands. By the 19th century these rebellions began to occur on an even larger scale. In the lesser tents, a rebellion led by (Kai-pu Jia-li-ya Yi-xi-mo-fu) [0418 2528 0502 0448 0068 0122 1585 5459 1133] broke out in 1812 and lasted until 1820; in 1836 another rebellion led by (Yi-sa-da-yi) [0122 5646 6671 0122] and (Ma-ha-mu-ba-te) [7456 0807 1191 1579 3676] broke out. From 1832 until 1836 the medium tents were disturbed by the rebellion led by (Sha-de-shi-an) [3097 1795 0087 1344]. During the 1820's, 1830's and 1840's a rebellion led by (Gai-nie-sa-lei) [5556 3206 5646 7191] spread over the whole of Kazakhstan, clearly expressing the anticolonialism of the masses. In all, this rebellion lasted 20 years. After Russia's bloody conquest of the three khanates the fires of rebellious struggle continued to burn. In 1898 the Andizhan rebellion, which is of great significance in the history of central Asia, broke out in the Fergana region and struck a powerful blow against the Russian aggressors. The leader of the rebellion, Muhammad Ali, called upon the people to rise up and fight for their independence.

The various resistance struggles mentioned above embodied the bitter and deep-seated hatred of the central Asian people for the Russian aggressors; they also incisively mock the fallacy promoted by the "voluntary incorporation" theory that the people of central Asia "hoped to become Russian subjects," and "sought Russian protection."

"The Promotion of Development" or Exploitation and Plunder?

The other argument used to defend Russian aggression is the so-called "promotion of development" theory. According to this argument the backward area of central Asia "needed" to establish "close trade links" with the advanced nation of Russia, and this provided a "profound economic reason" for the "merging" of certain areas in central Asia with Russia. Because of this, "the inclusion of Kazakhstan and Kirgiz in maps of the Russian empire marked a great step forward in the history of these people." ((Pu-luo-huo-luo-fu): "On the Sino-Soviet Border Question," p 139) Moreover, "as far as the destiny of the different peoples in Caucasia and the central Asia was concerned, their incorporation within the economically

and culturally advanced nation of Russia was a very fortuitous event." ("An Outline of Russian History," edited by (Nuo-suo-fu) [6179 4792 1133] and published by the Leningrad section of the Soviet Scientific Press, Vol 1, p 218, 1972 second edition) Even more absurd is the idea that the fortifications built by the Russian aggressors to extend their control and repress the local people "provided the conditions for the economic development of the surrounding areas." (Gullevich: "The Qing Empire's Invasion of Central Asia and Russian Policy in the Second Half of the 18th Century") Such gangster logic is typical of colonial aggressors, and ultimately is nothing more than a defense of czarist Russia's plundering of central Asia's rich natural resources, vast territory and cheap labor.

One of the main reasons for the invasion of central Asia was "the need for central Asian cotton to supply Russia's rising textile industry." ((Luo-ji-tuo-fu-ji-ji) [5012 2448 2094 1113 2248 1015]: "Russia and Asia," "Peter the Great, Chapter 2," published in 1933 in New York) Especially after the reform of the serf system in 1861, Russian capitalism developed steadily and it was the textile industry which grew the fastest, creating an ever increasing demand for cotton. The plunder of central Asia's cheap raw cotton, therefore, gave impetus to Russia's stepped-up aggression in central Asia. Another important factor was the urgent need for the emergent capitalist class to open up new markets. Owing to the fact that Russia's economic development lagged far behind the West's and her products were unable to compete with those of the Western nations, it was imperative that Russia be able to develop the large central Asian market. As early as 1856, General (Bo-la-lamu-bie-er-ge) [0514 2139 2139 1191 0446 1422 2706] of czarist Russia's general staff stated that, "The future of Russia does not lie in Europe. We should turn our attention toward Asia. It is essential that the factories and handicrafts workshops which consume our raw materials should be able to find a new outlet for their products. Because of competition the European market is closed to the products of Russian factories and workshops, we must turn to the vast territories of the Asian countries in order to sell our own products." ((Ka-er-fen) [0807 1422 5358]: "The Merging of Central Asia With Russia," p 87, published by Moscow: Scientific Publishing House in 1965) The planting of large areas of land in central Asia with cotton made this originally self-sufficient region dependent on Russian imports and turned the area into a market for Russian metal and textile products as well as grain, sugar and wood.

In addition to this, Russia used immigrants to seize large tracts of land. As Lenin said, "The history of Russia's autocratic system is a history of the plunder of places, provinces and nations' territories." ("Complete Works of Lenin," "The Democratic Socialist Party's Land Program During the First Revolution From 1905-1907," Vol 13, p 311) After the reform of the serf system in 1861, approximately 20 percent of Russian land was in the hands of landlords. In order to pacify the discontented peasants who had lost their land the czarist government moved many of them into central Asia. For example, in 1893, czarist Russia sent over 200,000 immigrants into Kazakhstan, and by 1914 Russian immigrants had occupied 41 million acres of land in the area. The result of this was that not only were large tracts of cultivable land occupied but also that the region's cattle breeding was seriously damaged by the destruction of the local pasture rotation system.

Commercial capital was also extremely active in central Asia; Russians made large sums of money out of currency exchange at exorbitant rates and other speculative activities. Moreover, the people of central Asia were subjected to bloodsucking exploitation in the form of exorbitant taxes and levies and onerous corvee duties.

The "promotion of development" argument is not only a distortion of historical facts, it is also reactionary and entirely absurd theoretically. The argument starts by denying that the central Asian people could have ever been able to develop and progress by relying on their own strength, and emphasizes the necessity of relying on conquest by outsiders. This argument disguises the (extremely reactionary and backward) nature of czarist Russia's colonial rule over central Asia. England at that time was far more advanced than Russia, but what did the English colonial rule in India do for the Indians? As Marx noted, "Because the British were the first conquerors to have a higher level of development than the Indians, Indian culture was unable to influence them. They destroyed the local communities, wrecked local industries and eradicated everything that was outstanding or exceptional in local society, and in so doing, managed to wipe out the Indian culture. Aside from destruction, the history of British rule in India is perhaps devoid of any other achievement." ("Complete Works of Marx and Engels," "The Future Results of British Rule in India," Vol 5, p 247) On the other hand, Marx also examined India's future prospects and affirmed that from a revolutionary dialectical point of view the establishment of a postal and telegraph system as well as railways by English colonialists helped to provide the material pre-conditions for India's future revolution. However, he also emphasized that "whatever the English capitalist class may be forced to do in India it will neither bring freedom to the masses nor fundamentally improve their social conditions; this is because such changes are not determined solely by the development of the productive force but are also determined by whether or not the productive force belongs to the people." (Ibid., p 250) What possible reason can there be for believing that Russia's colonial rule in central Asia, which was even more reactionary and backward than England's in India, could have possibly benefited the people of central Asia more than British rule did the Indians? As Lenin suggested, "In the border regions of Russia one can see that Russia's oppressed minorities often enjoy a relatively large amount of freedom in neighboring countries. The czarist government is even more reactionary than neighboring countries and does all it can to promote greater Russian nationalism. In fact, this government is the main obstacle in the way of economic development." ("Complete Works of Lenin," "The Democratic Socialist Party's Land Program During the First Revolution From 1905-1907," Vol 19, p 548)

The various fallacies promoted by Soviet historians cannot help but remind us of the deeds and acts of today's ruling clique in the Soviet Union. If one looks at Soviet hegemonism today, are not the invasion of Afghanistan and other aggressive activities all committed under the banner of "preventing" the invasion of other nations, the local people's "wishes" and "the promotion of development"? It is for this reason that the exposure of these fallacies is, in reality, also the exposure of the Soviet Union's hegemonism.

WHERE IS THE STRATEGIC FOCAL POINT IN DEVELOPING OUR COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE?

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 21, 1 Nov 81 inside back cover

[Article by Xi Guisheng [1598 2710 3932]]

[Text] Since the smashing of the "gang of four," our economic theory circles have offered various conflicting views on the strategic focal point in developing our country's agriculture. Some comrades are of the opinion that we should go the way of the West European countries and concentrate on the development of animal husbandry. They believe that we should swiftly change the diet of our people and, by the end of this century, increase the proportion of the output value of animal husbandry in the gross value of agricultural output from the present approximately 15 percent to 40 to 50 percent. Hence, from the macroscopic point of view, it is extremely important to grasp well the strategic focal point in developing our country's agriculture. The following are some of our rudimentary viewpoints on the results of certain economic conditions within our country and abroad.

Past practices in nearly all the developed countries have clearly shown that developing the animal husbandry industry entails the consumption of a large quantity of grain. In the United States, the average annual consumption of food grain to produce meat, milk and eggs for 1 person is as high as 1,990 jin. In West Germany it is 1,490 jin. At present, in the developed countries, the output of 1 jin of beef generally requires 7 jin of grain, 1 jin of pork requires 4 jin of grain and 1 jin of poultry requires 2 jin of grain. The grain required has to be produced either in the home country, as is the case in the United States, Canada and so on, or else imported from abroad as in Japan, West Germany and other countries. Hence, generally speaking, without a sufficient supply of grain, it is difficult for animal husbandry to grow rapidly.

On average, the annual per capita consumption of grain in our country has remained, for a long time, at about 600 jin, much lower than in the United States, where it was 2,414 jin in 1977, or in Canada, where, in the same year, it was 3,589 jin, or the world's average level of 700 jin. Under such conditions, to exchange several jin of grain for 1 jin of meat and thus to give priority to the development of animal husbandry is a road basically not worth taking. As for relying on imported grain to develop animal husbandry, this would be pure nonsense.

This being the case, is it possible for us not to use grain, but grass, to develop animal husbandry? We have about 3.3 billion mu of grassland available for use (including 1.2 billion mu of grassland in desert regions) plus some 700 million mu of grassy hills and grassy slopes in the agricultural areas, or roughly 4 billion mu of available grassland. If everything goes well, this can produce 2 to 3 billion jin of meat, averaging 2 to 3 jin per person. Hence, the necessary conditions are lacking for the vigorous development of animal husbandry. It is also impossible to raise the proportion of the output value of animal husbandry in the gross value of agricultural output.

Intrinsically, is it an advanced measure at all to use meat as the mainstay in the diet? The diet of a people evolves from their long history and their social environment. What is more important is that in a nation, or a race of people, the proportion of meat in the diet does not necessarily signify whether the nation or race is advanced or backward. On the other hand, the West has, at present, begun to realize that eating too much meat is dangerous to one's health and is beginning to rectify this situation.

It can be seen from the above analysis that we should place the strategic focal point in developing agriculture on grain production and not on animal husbandry. In so doing, we are not reverting to the old road of taking grain as the key link to the exclusion of all others. At present, we should put emphasis on the full utilization of our land and on the concurrent development of all the five industries or trades--agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline products and fishery.

As for the people's diet, we cannot expect too much. We can only strive for a suitable increase in the supply of meat and milk over and above what we have at present. If, by the end of the century, the per capita grain availability can reach 800 jin, then, with grain as the main food, life would be easier and circumstances more advantageous. However, if we were to follow the example of the West European countries in developing animal husbandry and artificially change our diet so that grain consumption would almost be double to over 1,000 jin per capita, then difficult days would be ahead of us. We do not necessarily have to follow the old road taken by the developed countries. We can only follow a road which accords with our national conditions and, on the basis of the all-round upgrading of the gross value of agricultural output, gradually and suitably increase in it the proportion of the output value of animal husbandry.

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